Lessons of Our People’s War: Political Preparation
(An adaptation of Part 2 and 3 of the articles penned by Khumalo Migwe – Jabulani “Mzala” Nxumalo – on the on-going debate regarding the focus of Umkhonto we Sizwe on driving the armed struggle towards a completely developed people’s war, February 1982).
On December 16, 1961, backed by the ANC (African National Congress) and the Communist Party, a new organisation made its appearance in South Africa: Umkhonto we Sizwe. A Manifesto that accompanied dramatic sabotage actions against the economic installations of the enemy, including a bomb attack inside the union buildings in Pretoria (the Administrative Headquarters of the Boer regime) said:
“THE PEOPLE’S PATIENCE IS NOT ENDLESS. THE TIME COMES IN THE LIFE OF ANY NATION WHEN THERE REMAINS ONLY TWO CHOICES: SUBMIT OR FIGHT. THAT TIME HAS COME TO SOUTH AFRICA.”
OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS
As already documented in most writings on guerrilla warfare, from Lenin to Che Guevara, from Amilcar Cabral to the Nicaraguan experience, armed struggle of guerrilla war becomes feasible only if:
a) There is disillusionment with the prospect of achieving liberation by traditional peaceful processes because the objective conditions blatantly bar the way to change;
b) there is readiness to respond to the strategy of armed struggle with all the enormous sacrifices which this involves;
c) there is in existence an experienced and dedicated political leadership capa
