The Hani Memorandum (An Analysis)

Around 7 January 1969, Chris Hani and six other Comrades signed a document, later known as the “Hani Memorandum”, that accused the African National Congress (ANC) in exile of being in a deep crisis as a result of the rot that had set in. After 18 frustrating months in jail, Hani would be a son for Livingstone and Nzimazana Mqotsi, in Woodlands, Lusaka.

When Hani and his company had returned to Lusaka from jail in Botswana, a party was thrown for them at the home of the South African Communist Party (SACP) couple, Jack and Ray Simons. Ben Magubane threw a party, too. However, surprisingly, and disturbingly, there was no other official welcome.

On their return from war (the Wankie Campaign) and prison, the Luthuli Detachment had been all but ignored by the ANC leadership. There were no ceremonies and no medals, no special briefings. The silence from the leadership began to eat at Hani. Within months, his confusion turned into a desperate kind of fury.

Finally, he put his name at the top of a list of seven signatures in the Memorandum, the signatories, included two former cellmates in Gaborone, gathered in Mqotsi’s home in Lusaka. According to Hani, “I felt that we did not get proper support, a proper follow-up. And I didn’t think that when we came back there was an interest in our experience, and what we had done, and what was the next step… We were in that state of limbo, state of suspense; and I and others could not stomach it.”

The Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) soldiers in the camps decried the rot that had set into the ANC while executing its external mission in exile, which included careerism of its leadership abroad, shady businesses run by leaders with a questionable background and how the party’s security had notoriously suppressed and persecuted MK cadres.

In the document, several names were mentioned. It was claimed that one “Thabo More” – the name by which Joe Modise was known – paid more attention to commercial enterprises like the furniture factory in Lusaka and a bone factory in Livingstone. Initially fronts for the ANC’s underground activities, the businesses were at that time run as true commercial ventures, as stated in the Memorandum.

Modise took a salary and owned a posh “militarily irrelevant” car. He was becoming middle class. His relative, Shadrack Tladi, was part of a trio with Boy Otto and Joseph Cotton, the son of ANC Treasurer-General, Moses Kotane, that was openly flirting with members of the US Peace Corps, an alleged “CIA front”. At the time, Tladi and Cotton handled much of the organisation’s highly sensitive information and transported war material.

It was also stated that the wife of the ANC’s Secretary General and Chief of Security, Duma Nokwe, worked for an Israeli intelligence-gathering agency. The Memorandum reflected the sense among some cadres that Duma Nokwe was indifferent and cynical towards battle-weary comrades.

In the camps, combatants who had offended the leadership were rumoured to have been dumped in dugouts half-filled with water, without any protection from the elements, for weeks at a time. There were secret trials and secret executions. MK Commander Joe Modise was reputed to have become a law unto himself, arbitrarily appointing and dismissing people, leading to the entrenchment of a culture in which sycophants prevailed.

According to the document, the movement had created a machinery that had become an end in itself and was completely divorced from the situation at home. Particular rancour was directed at the bogus ANC Youth Organisation, and one of its leaders, Thabo Mbeki, was singled out. While Hani went to war in Wankie, Mbeki was studying at the University of Sussex, funded by the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), the white liberal student organisation. It felt as if there was clear nepotism going on.

Finally, it called for the need to seriously investigate ways and means of going home, with MK fully involved in the process. It concluded that “all these problems must be resolved by a conference between the ANC leadership and members of MK, and not just handpicked individuals”.

ANC Acting President, Oliver Tambo, was particularly disturbed by the memorandum of Hani and the other signatories because it was a reflection of the low morale that was clearly developing in the camps.

Many cadres of MK had become disillusioned with the lack of progress in returning home, and blamed it all on the style of the leadership of the ANC. The officers in charge of the camps, particularly at Mandela Camp and at Kongwa, were accused of ‘brutality, arrogance, militarism’. At Kongwa, for example, the camp commander would take morning inspection of the troops in his dressing gown and was also accused of excessive drinking, even during the early hours of the morning.

During the time of the release of the memorandum, the Treasurer General of the ANC and General Secretary of the South African Communist Party, Moses Kotane, had suffered a stroke and was being treated in a hospital in Moscow. Acting President OR Tambo, who had an enormous affection for Moses Kotane — and respect for his integrity — was affronted by the ad hominem attack.

Tambo’s assessment of the prevailing situation at that time was that the movement clearly needed a shake-up — so much evidence of disappointment, anger and division had been expressed. For Tambo, this step was clearly urgent.

The Hani Memorandum and its authors had opened a can of worms and had deeply angered many in the leadership — some even demanded that the young men be court-martialled and executed for treason. The analysis was that a divisive crisis was developing within the ranks of the Movement. Apart from the sharp criticisms of the lack of movement both inside and outside South Africa, frustration was breeding a self-destructive tendency.

Tambo concluded that in the collective leadership were individuals who had behaved badly. The question therefore was how was he to restructure the movement and constructively assess its progress and challenges? As a remedy, he immediately called a meeting of all members and MK troops in the vicinity of Lusaka.

At that meeting, he delivered ‘an emotional speech’, wherein he expressed his indignation that a dedicated leader, such as Moses Kotane, should have been slandered. Many other leaders in the Movement were incensed by the memorandum. This propelled Tambo to hold discussions with colleagues in several cities, listening to their opinions on the problems facing the Movement and the way forward.

Several analysts and commentators on the history of the ANC and MK argue that the Hani Memorandum led to the holding of the Morogoro Consultative Conference on 25 April to 1 May 1969, which reflected the seriousness of the issues that had arisen prior to the conference and the determination of the leadership to unite its cadres behind a common programme.

Chris Hani also agreed with this perspective, when he maintained that “Our detractors would not say that we had contributed, but if we had not spoken out, in my own view there would have been no Morogoro Conference. Our criticism created a crisis within the Movement which jolted them. And again (prompted) a clear definition of the objectives of the ANC. The ANC began to say the working class is the backbone of our struggle. And I would want to believe that our erratic, if you like, criticism and anger did contribute to this sort of thing.”

The order that was given to the Morogoro Conference was: “Close Ranks and Intensify the Armed Struggle!”

Castro Khwela
Good day fellow Compatriots!