Landmine Warfare in the Northern Transvaal

Landmine Warfare in the Northern Transvaal

On the morning of 26 November 1985, at approximately 08:20, an employee of Petermix, a cement delivery company, Elijah Mokgamatha heard a huge blow behind the Nissan diesel truck he was driving, while making a U-turn, after missing a turn off to his destination. Following the blow, the truck got into a shock, which forced Mokgamatha to get off and check what had happened. He then realised that the truck and the semi-trailer that was attached to it were seriously damaged by an explosion, which later on was confirmed to have detonated a landmine.

About half-an-hour later, Gert de Villiers heard a tremendous thud while he was driving a Toyota bakkie eastwards along the “sisal fence road”, which ran parallel to the South African-Zimbabwe border, with his dog on board. When he climbed out of the bakkie, he saw that the rear part of the vehicle had been thrown close to thirty metres into the bush. When an investigation was conducted on the incident, it was established that the vehicle was hit by a landmine.

Three days before these incidences, on 23 November 1985, Mzondeleli Nondula and Jabulani Mbuli were part of a group of twelve Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) cadres who were briefed by Julius Maliba (aka “Mancheck”) in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, on recalibrating rural guerrilla warfare. “Mancheck”, the former Commander of the Sibasa Group of the Luthuli Detachment in the Wankie Campaign, was at the time chairperson of the African National Congress’s (ANC’s) Forward Area Machinery, which after the Kabwe Conference was called the “Zimbabwe Regional Politico-Military Committee”.

The briefing was in line with the recommendations of the Kabwe Conference’s Strategy and Tactics Commission that whites in South Africa were supposed to feel the impact of MK’s armed actions to a greater extent. According to Mancheck, the areas next to the border, specifically the Soutpansberg, was going to be the Group’s operational zone, where the white community was organised into rural commando structures. The apartheid regime regarded the farming community in such areas as the first echelon of defence along the border areas. This section of the white population was encouraged and sponsored to stay there as militarily trained personnel safeguarding the border area, which consequently made them legitimate guerrilla targets.

During the evening on the same day, 23 November 1985, the Group was transported southwards to the Limpopo River, where they created a temporary overnight base on the Zimbabwean side of the border. The Group was then divided into two Teams of six, one commanded by “Agrippa”, and the other by “Chillies”. Each individual was equipped with a round landmine, brown in colour, approximately 25 centimetres in height, weighing about six kilograms, as well as an AK-47 assault rifle.

From their position, which was concealed by bush, they could see a patrol vehicle doing rounds on the South African side of the border, accompanied by a Jeep-like truck, as well as foot-soldiers led by tracker dogs.

On the following evening, 24 November 1985, at around 21:00, Agrippa’s Team began crossing the Limpopo River, and when they were inside the South African border, they spent the night in the bush observing the patrols. At approximately 19:00, the following evening, 25 November 1985, they began retracing their steps northwards to the border patrol route, where they began planting their six mines on the patrol route. Meanwhile the Team led by Chillies was also on the patrol road, where they planted mines next to a farm. After they finished planting their mines, the Team then crossed back to Zimbabwe.

Landmines are explosive devices that are often concealed under or camouflaged on the ground, which were designed to destroy or disable enemy targets as they passed over or near them. They are divided into two types: anti-tank mines, which are designed to disable vehicles, such as tanks or any mobile units; and anti-personnel mines that are made to injure or kill human beings. Most of these landmines are typically pressure activated, exploding automatically when stepped on by a person or driven over by a vehicle, though alternative detonation mechanisms are sometimes used, such as booby traps. A landmine may cause damage by direct blast effect, by fragments that are thrown by the blast, or by both. They are typically laid throughout an area, creating a minefield that is dangerous to cross.

The controversy in the use of land mines is because of their indiscriminate nature and their potential to remain dangerous many years after a conflict has ended, harming civilians, livestock and the economy. Pressure groups emerged in the post-Second World War period to campaign against the use of landmines that resulted in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, a global movement to prohibit their use. The efforts of this campaign led to the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, also known as the Ottawa Treaty. The treaty was signed by 164 nations to date, with China, the Russian Federation and the United States refusing to become signatories.

Although landmines are largely used in conventional warfare to destroy or disable enemy vehicles and personnel during massive conflicts, they were commonly deployed by guerrilla forces to destabilise well-organised forces during unconventional warfare. In the wars against the colonial forces in southern Africa, guerrillas used anti-tank mines to throw the apartheid colonial military convoys into disarray before attacking them. To discourage detection and removal efforts, they also laid anti-personnel mines directly parallel to the anti-tank mines. This initially resulted in heavy military and police casualties, as the vast distances of road network vulnerable to guerrilla sappers every day made comprehensive detection and clearance efforts impractical.

It must be emphasised that with regard to guerrilla mine warfare in South Africa, Umkhonto forces never used anti-personnel mines, specifically because the ANC was concerned about civilian casualties. The ANC only advocated for the utilisation of anti-tank mines, which required at least 300kg to detonate, because the primary targets were the military patrols on roads immediately next to borders. The mines were laid overnight so that they would be triggered when the apartheid South African Defence Force (SADF) patrolled early the following morning. It was reasoned that because farmworkers generally did not have transport and moved around on foot, they were unlikely to be affected.

While regretting all loss of life, the ANC noted that the apartheid regime had declared white border farms “military zones”, with white farmers integrated into the security system and provided with the tools of war, including automatic weapons. Therefore, the ANC’s limited use of landmines, which began in late 1985, MK operatives were under strict instructions to carry out reconnaissance properly so that military patrols were the primary targets of landmine operations. In the border areas, where nearly all landmines were detonated, the precise targeting of military patrols was easier said than done.

Nevertheless, Umkhonto we Sizwe MHQ continued to stress policy regarding careful reconnaissance and avoidance of civilian targets. The ANC did not have reliable statistics on how many people were killed in landmine explosions for which MK was responsible. A rough estimate based on available press reports revealed that approximately thirty explosions took place between November 1985 and July 1987 resulting in about 23 deaths in total, including two cadres who were killed whilst laying mines.

The decision to use landmines and the choice of area of operation was basically made at Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) Military HQ. Th responsible commands were based in Zimbabwe and later, for operations in the Eastern Transvaal, in Swaziland. Units were sent into the country to conduct reconnaissance with the aim or determining the movements of enemy personnel on the roads, their routines and schedules, the habits of local people, etc. This usually took a few days, and once the reconnaissance was completed, cadres reported back to their commanders. Operational plans were then drawn up, and the reports and plans were sent to MK MHQ for approval. When operations were approved, detailed implementation plans were formulated and cadres were instructed to lay the mines.

Initial operations were carried out fairly close to the borders, approximately 2–4 km from the border fence. However, ANC President and MK Commander-in-Chief, OR Tambo, ordered that operations should be carried out deeper inside the country as the governments of neighbouring countries were coming under pressure from the apartheid regime. The governments that came under a lot of pressure because of the landmine explosions were Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Botswana, where landmine warfare was effective, especially in the Transvaal and northern Natal provinces.

The effect of this was to move some operations into areas where the roads were not used almost exclusively by the apartheid SADF and Commando farmers, but also by civilian vehicles. In addition, because cadres had to be in the country longer, there was an increase in the number of firefights between guerrillas and the security forces. Ultimately, when it became apparent that the landmine operations were not having the desired effect of consistently striking at security forces, they were suspended by Umkhonto MHQ.

Sources:
Wikipedia.
South African History Online (SAHO).
African National Congress, “Statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission”, August 1996.
African National Congress, “Further Submissions and Responses by the African National Congress to Questions Raised by the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation”, 12 May 1997.
Howard Barrell, “Conscripts to Their Age: African National Congress Operational Strategy, 1976 – 1986”, D. Phil: Oxford University, 1993.
Joe Slovo, “1976 to the Present”, Dawn, Souvenir Issue, 1986.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report”, Vol. 2, 29 October 1998.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report”, Vol. 6, 21 March 2003.
Thula Simpson, “Umkhonto we Sizwe: The ANC’s Armed Struggle”, Penguin, 2016.

Castro Khwela
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