Wankie Campaign – Dube Team Enters Botswana

Wankie Campaign – Dube Team Enters Botswana

On 29 August 1967, Chris Hani, Jackson Mandla, Alfred Mfamana and their Main Group Commander, John Dube (aka “Sotsha Ngwenya”), underwent an interrogation process undertaken by the Botswana Police and they declined to give any information except their names.

It all began on 28 August 1967, when the four arrived at a large store in Nkange, Botswana, wearing military uniforms but bearing no armaments. They then purchased civilian clothes from the store and immediately changed into them. Noticing their uniforms, the storekeeper notified a local councillor, who arrived and promised the four a lift to Francistown. Instead of taking them to Francistown as promised, the Famine Relief vehicle that collected the four took them to the police camp at Totome, which the councillor had arranged with the police.

As they were being interrogated, it emerged that John Dube spoke fluent Kalanga, which indicated that he had Rhodesian origins. When the police asked him whether he was involved in the fighting that took place in Rhodesia in the previous days, he eventually admitted and agreed to lead the police to a place in the Maitengwe lands, on the border between Rhodesia and Botswana. When they arrived at the place, he pointed out a cache including three AK-47 submachine rifles, one Russian PPSH submachine gun, one Russian RGD-5 hand grenade, and another hand grenade of Russian design that was manufactured in North Vietnam. He then admitted to the police that he and his three colleagues had utilised the arms during fighting in Rhodesia.

Hani was restless, lying on his single bed, as cold air blew through the openings at the top of the cell wall. He had been reduced to wearing short pants, a jacket and a jersey, although he found prison almost luxurious after an entire month in the Rhodesian bush. At least they had enough to eat, which included porridge in the mornings, meat, vegetables and sometimes even fish for lunch and dinner. Having crossed into newly independent Botswana with three other top guerrillas towards the end of August, after a month of running battles with the Rhodesian security forces, they were already regarded as heroes in the sub-region, with the progress of the Wankie Campaign having been widely reported.

After all, it was the first time that South African liberation forces had directly and effectively engaged a substantial enemy force. However, the battles had taken their toll on the joint MK-ZIPRA (Umkhonto we Sizwe-Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army) force, which had started with around 100 men. At the time they left the Main Group with his Commander, John Dube, to look for water and food, leaving half of the Main Group behind, they were only a section of eight men.

MK and ZIPRA guerrillas who retreated into Botswana during the Wankie campaign in the hope of contacting their headquarters for further instructions knew full well that it was the policy of the newly independent country’s government to act against anyone using Botswana as a springboard for military operations. As it happened, they were unable to contact Lusaka from Botswana, because the radios they carried were inadequate or defective.

Whatever their intentions were, no veteran described this scattering as breaking rank, although many mentioned that they were eventually arrested as individuals. Most made it to Botswana where they were reunited in prison. Those who were unfortunate enough to remain in Rhodesia were killed in pursuit, transferred to South Africa, or imprisoned in Rhodesian prisons.

In August 1967, when police arrested 17 MK-ZIPRA insurgents on the Rhodesian border, the Botswana government decided to make an example of them. The group later claimed that the South African government had exerted pressure on the Botswana authorities to prevent the country being used by guerrillas in transit. The police assured the guerrillas that their lives were in no danger, and that if they surrendered their weapons, the situation could be resolved amicably. They accepted the deal, only to discover that the police were under the command of white officers from South Africa and Britain, who promptly manacled and handcuffed them.

The guerrillas were taken to Francistown, where they were interrogated and placed in cells. A week later, they were taken to court and found guilty of entering Botswana illegally, importing and being in possession of arms. Those in Botswana received two- to four-year sentences, while others sent to prison in Rhodesia remained there until independence in 1980, and the few transferred to South Africa served fifteen- to twenty-year sentences on Robben Island.

Hani was sentenced to six years in prison in Botswana, while the other members of the group were given sentences ranging from six to nine years each. Prison conditions in Gaborone were nowhere near as harsh as in Rhodesia or South Africa. Hani described the Batswana as gentle and sympathetic people, who did not physically abuse the imprisoned guerrillas. They worked in the prison gardens and were allowed to study, were well fed and received medical attention when necessary. They had reasoned that the Botswana government would be sympathetic to their cause. But it was also important not to jeopardise the country’s newfound independence by giving the Pretoria regime an excuse to invade.

For the first time in years, Hani had the luxury of time to read and read for the pure delight of it. And here, inside the cell, he also found a ready ear for talk about politics. Conditions were not harsh in the beginning. Prisoners were not abused and spent their days doing manual labour, Hani being assigned to water the plants and to do general garden maintenance. Unlike the government, which had vacillated in its approach, the warders were sympathetic to the liberation fighters from across the border.

Chris Hani was typically reflective afterwards, saying in an interview that the Wankie campaign had “failed to achieve its main objectives, militarily speaking”. The Wankie combatants could have elevated themselves to the position of being heroes, because that is surely what they had become. For Hani, Wankie was “an important experience for the organisation”.

According to his observations, “We were able to have a taste of military action. We were tempered in battle, we were tested under difficult conditions and I think we succeeded. [The standard of the soldiers] was excellent. Our moral qualities, our conviction and our toughness were exceptional, and we maintained a discipline and unity which very few armies would have under those circumstances. I mean, no regular army would have endured, you know, marching all the way from there without proper logistics.”

“Our supplies became depleted and we were moving to a barren part of Zimbabwe. We decided that it would be futile to continue fighting because the enemy was bringing in more reinforcement. So we deliberately took a decision to retreat to Botswana The aim of this decision is important to emphasise. This was no surrender to the paramilitary units of Botswana government. It was important for us to retreat to strategic parts of Botswana, refresh ourselves, heal those who were not well, acquire food supplies and proceed. We then crossed over to Botswana.”

Sources:
Chris Hani, “The Wankie Campaign”, Dawn – Souvenir Issue, December 1986.
Rendani Moses Ralinala, Jabulani Sithole, Gregory Houston and Bernard Magubane, “Chapter 12: The Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns”, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 1, 1960-1970, South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET), Zebra, 2015.
Thula Simpson, “Umkhonto we Sizwe: The ANC’s Armed Struggle”, Penguin, 2016.
Janet Smith and Beauregard Tromp, “Hani: A Life Too Short”, Jonathan Ball, 2009.
Stephen Davis, “The ANC’s War Against Apartheid: Umkhonto we Sizwe and the Liberation of South Africa”, Indiana University, 2018.

Castro Khwela
Good evening fellow Compatriots!