A Tense Mozambican Atmosphere after the Nkomati Accord

A Tense Mozambican Atmosphere after the Nkomati Accord

On 24 March 1984, a New York Times newspaper report claimed that according to African National Congress (ANC) officials in Maputo, the atmosphere in Mozambique was tense for ANC cadres and Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) combatants following the signing of the Nkomati Accord. At least twelve homes of South African activists in the city were raided by Mozambican security officials, including the residence of Joe Slovo (New York Times, 26 March 1984).

Apparently, no documents were seized during the raids, but four people were detained, weapons were confiscated, including a handgun that was issued to Slovo, who was not at home during the raid. Slovo was at that time in Swaziland, busy appointing a “Co-ordinating Committee”, which was tasked with overseeing ANC political and military work following the Nkomati Accord. The Committee’s Chairperson was to be Ronnie Kasrils, its Secretary and Treasurer Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, and its members were to be Siphiwe Nyanda, representing the Transvaal Machineries, and Thami Zulu, as the representative of the Natal military structures.

The signing of the Nkomati Accord on 16 March 1984 was hailed as a great diplomatic victory by the Mozambican government, which for various reasons was not actually true. For instance, on the eve of the ceremony, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere paid a short visit to Maputo, seemingly in a bid to dissuade Samora Machel from going ahead with signing the Accord, but without success. Based on Nyerere’s analysis, the Nkomati Accord “For South Africa it has been absolutely wonderful. And the Americans think it is a tremendous example of the success of . . . what is that policy called? – Ah yes! ‘Constructive engagement’! They keep on saying how wonderful it is.”

According to Nyerere, “We think it is a humiliation. We don’t want any more Nkomatis. It is the success of the South African policy of destabilising the frontline states and it is assisted in this by the USA (United States of America). And it is proper that we should view it completely frankly. It is a defeat on our part. We understand why Mozambique had to look for some accommodation at Nkomati but they haven’t even got the minimum they thought they could get out of it” (New African, 1985).

The ANC became the most adversely affected party with the signing of the Accord, considering the interview made by the ANC’s United Nations Representative, Johnny Mfanafuthi Makhathini, wherein he recalled that ANC President, Oliver Tambo, had to wait in Maputo during the early part of 1984 for “some occasion for discussion” with Mozambican President Samora Machel. The ANC leadership was worried that Machel would make more concessions to the apartheid regime, since he had given them a yard, they “will demand a mile. And they’ll eventually get a lot of mileage” (Shubin).

It was only a week after the agreement that the truth was unravelled, when Mariano Metsinha, the Minister of Security, invited Joe Slovo and Jacob Zuma, the ANC Representative in Mozambique, to his office, where he told them that searches were already being conducted in ANC residences and offices in Maputo. According to Metsinha, the number of ANC activists in Maputo was to be limited to ten, all arms supplies were to be banned, and the MK camp in Nampula was to be closed. All other activists had to leave Mozambique but were not supposed to go to countries adjacent to South Africa.

Metsinha further added that only the ANC President and Secretary-General had the right to visit the country at any time and only a limited number of people on a special list would be exempted from entry visas, all others had to request visas in advance. The Minister’s instructions were recorded, probably to be played back for apartheid security officials, as the recorder was immediately switched off when Slovo began asking questions.

Searches in ANC residences and offices continued unabated in broad daylight and, besides Slovo’s apartment, Moses Mabhida’s flat was also searched. Mozambique was apparently exhibiting to the Pretoria regime that it was undertaking the agreement to the latter. Relations between the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) also deteriorated, since on 5 May 1984, Moses Mabhida was instructed to leave Maputo for Lusaka.

“One of the tragedies of today’s dilemma”, the SACP argued, “is that Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord without adequate consultation with all the parties concerned. It appeared to be an individual decision reached unilaterally. If that is to be the pattern for the future, then there is no doubt that enemies of the apartheid regime will be knocked off one by one. They truly either stand together or they will go under individually. One of the most encouraging developments since the Nkomati Accord was signed was the unanimity reached at the meeting of the frontline states attended by the ANC and SWAPO (South West Africa People’s Organisation) at Arusha towards the end of April” (The African Communist, No. 98, Third Quarter, 1984).

The Nkomati Accord had a confusing effect on the South African liberation struggle, particularly creating a number of practical challenges for the ANC. For example, on the eve of the Accord, many MK fighters were evacuated from Maputo to Swaziland, creating a lot of tensions with the authorities in the Swazi Kingdom. A large number of MK cadres were intercepted and deported to Tanzania, since Swaziland also had a similar non-publicised pact with the apartheid regime.

Responding to these challenges, the ANC maintained that “The Pretoria regime is acting in the manner that it is, to try to extricate itself out of the crisis that confronts its racist and colonial system of apartheid. It hopes that after it has ‘pacified’ our neighbours and driven the ANC out of our region, it will then have a free hand to suppress the mass democratic movement of our country and thus create the conditions for it to spin out its intricate web of measures for the refinement and entrenchment of the apartheid system” (Sechaba, May 1984).

For most ANC activists and MK combatants, the Nkomati Accord was an annoyance, especially by delaying the processes for those who were determined to return to South Africa and intensify the armed struggle. Ultimately, the MK Command had decided that with or without the Nkomati Accord, operations close to the Mozambique border would continue without any constraints.

Sources:
NYT Reporter, “Mozambique Seizes South African Rebels”, New York Times, 26 March 1984.
Anver Versi, “This 1985 Interview with Julius Nyerere”, New African, 25 January 2018.
Thula Simpson, “Umkhonto we Sizwe: The ANC’s Armed Struggle”, Penguin, 2016.
Vladimir Shubin, “ANC: A View from Moscow”, Jacana, 2010.
Editorial Notes, “What the Nkomati Accord Means for Africa”, The African Communist, No. 98, Third Quarter, 1984.
Alfred Nzo, “ANC on the Nkomati Accord”, Sechaba, May 1984.

Castro Khwela
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