Operation Vula Exposed – Part 3: The Pretoria Minute

Operation Vula Exposed – Part 3: The Pretoria Minute

On the night of 6 August 1990, at approximately 23:00, apartheid President F.W. De Klerk and African National Congress (ANC) leader Nelson Mandela held a joint press conference at the Union Buildings in Pretoria, following their meeting that day. Mandela was flanked by other ANC leaders, including Joe Modise and Joe Slovo, who were the main protagonists on Umkhonto we Sizwe’s (MK’s) armed struggle. During the talks, the ANC made a concession on ceasing the armed struggle subsequent to intelligence acquired by the apartheid regime when Operation Vula became exposed.

When Mandela was asked on the action to be taken to ensure that the announcement was to be adhered to at the grassroots level, he mentioned that there was no longer going to be an infiltration of men and arms into South Africa. Moreover, Mandela asserted that any related military action was to be suspended and that they hoped to be able to communicate with the people and to inform them of what had been decided.

Again, when Mandela was asked as to where they thought they made the greatest concessions in comparison to their previous posture, he responded that as far as the ANC was concerned, they had declared the suspension of the armed struggle with immediate effect. According to Mandela, “You will notice that, on previous occasions, we have said that the ANC will be prepared to consider the suspension of hostilities only if the government first removes the obstacles to negotiation. But we came to this meeting already having decided that we will declare a cease-fire with immediate effect. So we have made a very significant concession.”

This concession was a result of a proposal made by Joe Slovo to Mandela just before the National Executive Committee (NEC) meeting of the ANC to prepare for the next engagement with the De Klerk regime. Slovo suggested that the ANC voluntarily suspend the armed struggle in order to create the right climate to move the negotiation process forward and to encourage De Klerk to continue with the process in order to show his supporters that his policy was bringing the benefits for the country. Mandela’s first reaction was negative, as he felt that the time was not yet ripe for such a move. However, the more he thought about it, the more he realised that the initiative was appropriate for the existing circumstances.

Accordingly, Mandela urged Slovo to present the proposal to the impending NEC meeting, since because of his radical credentials, he would not be accused of having been duped by the apartheid government or of having gone soft. When Slovo raised the matter, it was firmly opposed by some who felt that the ANC was giving De Klerk’s supporters more than what was due to the oppressed. Nevertheless, Mandela managed to defend Slovo’s proposal on the basis that the purpose of the armed struggle was, besides the armed seizure of power, also meant to bring the apartheid regime to the negotiating table. Therefore, in order to show good faith, they had to offer such a proposal, which could always be withdrawn, in case the circumstances demanded such a consideration.

Consequently, the document that became the product of the meeting, in which the ANC agreed to suspend the armed struggle, was titled the Pretoria Minute. The Minute was aimed at furthering the broad objectives put forward at Groote Schuur, which was to ensure the resumption of the release of political prisoners on 1 September 1990, with the plan that the process was to be completed by 30 April 1991. In terms of the agreement, it was also made clear that there would be indemnity for groups from October 1990, with the process to be completed by May 1991.

The most important part of the Pretoria Minute was that the ANC announced the suspension of the armed struggle. Mandela had convened a meeting of MK commanders and other ANC leaders in Cape Town to discuss the issue of the suspension of the armed struggle. Mandela argued that the ANC could not be part of an atmosphere of tension, but had to build, since the emotional life of a long-battered people was fragile.

As a concession, the De Klerk regime agreed to accept that MK was not only legal but also that membership of it was not a crime. It knew MK had arms caches inside the country and that it might continue to recruit. The apartheid regime also agreed that the ANC was entitled to maintain its existing structures, and, to this end, the government would review sections of the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 that restricted the activities of political organisations.

On 1 August 1990, Mandela read a statement to the media relating to the mistake he made in inferring that De Klerk was demanding the exclusion of the General Secretary of the African Communist Party (SACP), Joe Slovo, from the peace negotiations. Mandela reiterated that the National Executive Committee of the ANC was going to do whatever it can to ensure that steps were taken to guarantee strict adherence to the Groote Schuur Minute. Mandela further asserted that he understood De Klerk’s concerns, and that the concerns were to be discussed at the 6 August 1990 meeting. Primarily, De Klerk’s concerns related to the exposition of Operation Vula, which indicated that the ANC was still devoted to the armed struggle.

However, Mandela’s statement made De Klerk to issue his own statement to the media on 2 August 1990, in which he welcomed “the fact that Mandela again unconditionally committed the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe and the SACP to honour the agreements of the Minute and undertook to take specific steps in this regard”. De Klerk then assured the media that the apartheid government had decided to go ahead with the talks at which his concerns regarding Operation Vula were to be discussed further.

Operation Vula was a direct attempt by the ANC to meet its longstanding commitment, since the 1970s, to shift its command and control structures to within South Africa’s borders. On 8 August 1988, at approximately 14:00, Ivan Pillay took Mac Maharaj and Siphiwe Nyanda from Swaziland into South Africa, thereby initiating “Operation Vula”, the project involving the infiltration of senior ANC leaders into the country, an Operation that was approved by President Oliver Tambo in 1986.

When they entered the country, Nyanda knelt and kissed South African soil, and then they proceeded to a stretch of tar road about forty kilometres from Piet Retief, where Totsie Memela was waiting for them. Both were wearing overalls, as if they were farmworkers, and had arms and falsified identity documents in their possession. They were then taken to a car driven by an expatriate Irishman, which dropped them at the Carlton Hotel, in Johannesburg. Ultimately, most of the operatives were detained after Operation Vula was exposed after Charles Ndaba was arrested in Durban.

However, there was a huge concern with reference to the Pretoria Minute, especially regarding the suspension of the armed struggle, since the ANC had undertaken to suspend armed attacks, and to stop the infiltration of soldiers and material, the creation of military underground structures, statements inciting violence, threats of armed action and military training inside the country. Mainly, the threat posed by right-wing Afrikaners was very real, since most of them were armed and continued to launch more attacks. Moreover, the violence in the townships had not subsided, but continued to lead to more deaths, particularly in Natal and the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) areas.

People in the townships were accusing the police and the security forces of aiding and abetting the violence, as they were making very few arrests, and it was obvious that they were fomenting rather than quelling the violence. The security forces, particularly the apartheid police and the defence force, would confiscate weapons in a specific area, and the following day Inkatha vigilantes would attack the area with same weapons that had been seized the previous day. Reports were provided to the ANC leaders of Inkatha vigilantes and members being escorted by the security forces to meetings where they planned the attacks.

As a response, Mandela gave a speech in September 1990 in which he said that there was a hidden hand behind the violence. According to Mandela, “there was a mysterious ‘Third Force’, which consisted of renegade men from the security forces who were attempting to disrupt the negotiations. I could not say who the members of the Third Force were, for I did not know myself, but I was certain that they existed and that they were murderously effective in their targeting of the ANC and the liberation struggle” (Mandela, 1994).
(To be continued).

Castro Khwela
Good day fellow Compatriots!