Revisiting the Nkomati Accord: 16 March 1984

Revisiting the Nkomati Accord: 16 March 1984

According to the African National Congress’s analysis of the Nkomati Accord, its principal objectives were “to isolate the ANC throughout southern Africa and to compel the independent countries to act as Pretoria’s agents in emasculating the ANC as the vanguard movement of the South African struggle for national liberation. To liquidate the armed struggle for liberation in South Africa. To gain new bridgeheads for the Pretoria regime in its efforts to undermine the unity of the Frontier States, destroy the SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference) and replace it with a so-called constellation of states and thus to transform the independent countries of southern African into its client states. And to use the prestige of the Frontline States in the campaign of the white minority regime to reduce the international isolation of apartheid South Africa and to lend legitimacy to its colonial and fascist state” (Alfred Nzo, Sechaba).

Furthermore, the ANC deduced that the Botha regime, in pursuit of these aims had “sought to reduce the independent countries of our region to the level of its bantustan creations by forcing them to join the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei bantustans in entering into so-called aggression pacts with Pretoria. Such accords, concluded as they are with a regime which has no moral or legal right to govern our country, cannot but help to perpetuate the illegitimate rule of the South African white settler minority. It is exactly for this reason that this minority has over the years sought to bind independent Africa to such agreements.”

In addressing the concerns of the Southern African region, the ANC confirmed that it was “profoundly conscious of the enormous political, economic and security problems that confront many of the peoples of our region. The blame for many of these problems must be laid squarely on the Pretoria regime which has sought to define the limit of independence of the countries of our region through a policy of aggression and destabilisation. … A just and lasting peace in our region is not possible while the fountainhead of war and instability in this area, the apartheid regime and oppressive system it maintains in South Africa and Namibia, continue to exist. The Botha regime knows that peace has broken out: rather, it has resorted to other means to continue its war for the domination of southern Africa.”

The South African Communist Party (SACP) also agreed with the ANC that “South Africa’s apartheid regime lies at the core of the cancer; it promotes discontent and revolutionary upheaval at home, which it seeks to contain by a combination of police-state terror and corruption of a black elite; it promotes conflict and upheaval outside in all the frontline states, to roll back the tide of independence and to reassert a new era of colonial-type economic and political dependence. The frontline states correctly understood their real situation when they created a cordon sanitaire of isolation around South Africa. The Nkomati Accord marks the breaking of that cordon. The Botha regime now feels more confident that it can spread the infection of apartheid and neo-colonialism more easily through Africa. The invitation of Premier Botha to visit a number of European states shows that his allies are of the same opinion” (The African Communist, No. 98, Third Quarter 1984).

ANC President Oliver Tambo accused Mozambique of responsibility for “the emasculation of the liberation struggle”. According to Tambo, “Let us look at this as it affects us now, but let us also think of tomorrow. How will this decision influence that tomorrow that we seek? How will our response to this matter, determine the situation in a year’s time?”

Tambo tried to put himself into FRELIMO’s (Mozambique Liberation Front’s) shoes by asserting that “I am not sure that in their position I would have gone quite as far as they have. But it must be accepted that the South African government, the South African regime, had decided to destroy Mozambique, to kill it as a state, and got pretty close to doing so. Mozambique, the leadership of Mozambique, were forced to choose, as it were, between life and death. They chose life, and life meant talking to the butchers of southern Africa; it meant hugging the hyena … For the rest of us, we must accept our position, but defend our own positions, defend our struggle” (Callinicos).

Sources:
Editorial Notes, “What the Nkomati Accord Means for Africa”, The African Communist, No. 98, Third Quarter 1984.
Luli Callinicos, “Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains”, David Philip, 2004.
Alfred Nzo, “ANC on the Nkomati Accord”, Sechaba, May 1984.
Thula Simpson, “Umkhonto we Sizwe: The ANC’s Armed Struggle”, Penguin Books, March 2016.
Gerhard Erasmus, “The Accord of Nkomati: Context and Content”, Occasional Paper, The South African Institute of International Affairs, October 1984.

Castro Khwela
Good morning fellow Compatriots!🙏🏾✊🏾👊🏾