Mandela’s Release Accompanied by Fighting Between the UDF and Inkatha
On the morning of 14 February 1990, the Natal Witness newspaper estimated that fighting around Durban and Pietermaritzburg had resulted in the death of over fifty people in the forty-eight-hour period since the release of the leader of the African National Congress (ANC), Nelson Mandela, from prison. On 13 February, Herman Stadler, the South African Police’s Chief of Public Relations, made a statement to the journalists in Pretoria about a large number of reports that were received by the apartheid police regarding the fighting that “exploded” in Natal on Sunday, 11 February 1990, following Mandela’s release.
Questionably, the Chief of Police in KwaZulu Bantustan, Jack Buchner, told the reporters that the fighting and killings were triggered by the murder of two Inkatha members by a mob of United Democratic Front (UDF) supporters on Saturday, 10 February, before Mandela’s release. The murder, according to Buchner, sparked violence between the supporters of the two organisations, which left thousands homeless. It was obvious that this statement by Buchner was intended to defend the atrocious act that were committed by Inkatha vigilantes, as it did not make sense why UDF will begin attacking Inkatha following the release of their leader, Nelson Mandela.
One of the reasons advanced for this violence was that pro-apartheid government forces as well as members of the apartheid security establishment wanted to destabilise and totally disrupt the negotiations between the ANC and other political formations with the apartheid regime. A further reason was that the UDF was growing in popularity in Natal, which was traditionally considered an Inkatha stronghold, as it governed the KwaZulu Bantustan. In the wake of their growing antagonism, Inkatha increasingly collaborated with groups from the right-wing of the spectrum, like the various police units active in KwaZulu and Natal as well as the National Party (NP), taking the role as a ‘surrogate force’ of the racist government to enforce apartheid order in the region.
Historically, the people of Natal had fought a long struggle against oppression. For instance, the victory of the forces of Isilo uCetshwayo kaMpande at the Battle of Isandlwana in 1879 had been an inspiration for those of who were engaged in the struggle for justice and freedom in South Africa. In 1906, in the reign of uDinizulu kaCetshwayo, the colonialists introduced the Poll Tax (Head Tax) and other regulations designed to force Africans to work for wages on the white farms and the large seaport in Durban. The Zulu people, led by Inkosi uBambatha kaMancinza, refused to bow their proud heads to these wicked demands, and a powerful spirit of resistance developed, which, like the Battle of Isandlwana, inspired generations of South Africans.
Another strand in the struggle against oppression began with the formation in Natal of the first black political organisation in Africa, the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), founded in 1894, which began a tradition of protest that under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi resulted in the passive resistance campaign of 1946. Over 2 000 Indians went to jail during the campaign. The campaign also led to the Xuma-Naicker-Dadoo Pact in 1947, and to the joint action of Africans and Indians in the Defiance Campaign of 1952.
Another great struggle in Natal was that of the workers. In January 1973, 2,000 workers at the Coronation Brick and Tile factory in Durban came out on strike and were followed by workers all over Durban. Out of these strikes grew a host of new union federations and, eventually Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the biggest and most powerful labour organisation in South Africa’s history.
Over the period from 1983 to 1990, more than 2 500 black Africans had died in the fighting in Natal, as followers of the UDF, an umbrella organisation allied with the ANC, had battled Chief Gatsha Buthelezi’s Inkatha movement, which had always claimed to have traditionally dominated South Africa’s 7 million Zulus. While the rivalry stemmed in part from the organisations’ different approaches to opposing Pretoria, mainly the violence in Natal had escalated into territorial warfare, as Inkatha was losing popularity in Natal, which it wrongfully considered as its traditional stronghold.
In its statement on the escalating violence perpetrated by Inkatha warlords in the country, the ANC maintained that “… there is sinister and well-orchestrated campaign afoot to spread the violence that has plagued Natal beyond that province. The persons behind this plot are receiving active assistance from elements in the police. The purpose of this unholy alliance is to terrorise the people in the most militant townships into submission, destroy and disrupt the people’s organisations … Under the prevailing circumstances the people must reserve their inalienable right to defend themselves when attacked. The responsibility for any violence that ensues, as a result, devolves squarely on the police” (Sechaba, Vol. 24 No. 9, September 1990).
Confessing to the question on where the ANC went wrong in its analysis of the direction given to resistance in rural Natal, ANC President Oliver Tambo stressed the point that “In a way, [Buthelezi] is our fault. We have not done and are not doing sufficient political work among the millions of our people who have been condemned to the Bantustans. The artificial boundaries purporting to fence them off from the rest of our country do not make them any less a vital and integral part of the popular masses fighting for national liberation and social emancipation of our country” (Luli Callinicos).
Sources:
South African History Online (SAHO).
Luli Callinicos, “Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains”.
Colin Bundy, “Nelson Mandela: Pocket Giants”.
Thula Simpson, “Umkhonto we Sizwe: The ANC’s Armed Struggle”.
ANC Statement, “Inkatha Seeks to Spread Its Violence Beyond Natal”, Sechaba, Vol. 24 No. 9, September 1990.
David B. Ottaway, “Mandela Tells Blacks to Unite in S. Africa”, Washington Post, 26 February 1990.
Maria Schuld, “Voting and violence in KwaZulu-Natal’s no-go areas”, Accord, AJCR 2013/1, 8 March 2013.
Castro Khwela
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