MK Attempting an Alternative Route, Zimbabwe, in the Early 1980s

MK Attempting an Alternative Route, Zimbabwe, in the Early 1980s

Facing pressure on its traditional routes, including Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho, the African National Congress (ANC) was beginning to explore other fronts, in particular Zimbabwe. On 11 June 1983, Frans Madimetsa Ranoto and Philemon Morake were arrested by locals, who handed them over to the apartheid police, where they were taken to Sibasa, in the Venda Bantustan, for interrogation, during which it was established that they were trained Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) members and that they entered the country from Zimbabwe. The news was a revelation for apartheid South African Military Intelligence, as it was the first confirmed case that they had of an infiltration launched through Zimbabwe.

On the evening of 9 June 1983, Madimetsa Ranoto entered South Africa from Zimbabwe as the head of a group of MK guerrillas including three others, Philemon Morake, “Thabo” and “James”. On the following morning, 10 June 1983, an apartheid South African Police counter-insurgency (COIN) unit noticed a hole that had been cut in the border fence with Zimbabwe, some sixty kilometres east of Messina.

Late that afternoon, three apartheid COIN Police members made contact with Ranoto’s group in the Limpopo River area. A shootout ensued, during which the four guerrillas fled in different directions and the police recovered a great amount of war material from the scene. The guerrillas who fled in different directions were unable to find each other after the confrontation with the police, but on the third day (11 June), Ranoto and Morake managed to find each other. Unfortunately they had lost all their equipment, including their food supplies, during the clash with the apartheid police, and they then decided to go and seek food among the local population, who instead handed them over to the police.

The four guerrillas were part of an MK contingent that was integrated into the group of twenty-five Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) cadres that were addressed by a ZIPRA Commander at the ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union) Headquarters in Lusaka in February 1980, wherein MK Special Operation Commander, Montso “Obadi” Mokgabudi, was present. The ZIPRA Commander, Irvine Khulekani Sibhona (aka “Barberton Muzwambila”), was the last ZIPRA Commander for the Southern Front, who informed the group of twenty-five that they were to infiltrate Zimbabwe and proceed to Assembly Point Juliet at Zezani, near Beitbridge, in the Sivoka Tribal Trust Land.

Juliet was one of a number of assembly points established in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to accommodate ZIPRA and ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, an armed wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union – ZANU) cadres as part of a ceasefire that came into effect on 23 December 1979 after an agreement that was reached at the Lancaster House constitutional talks on 21 December 1979. When ZIPRA moved to Zezani Assembly Point in Beitbridge, Umkhonto cadres also moved in disguised as ZIPRA combatants.

According to the ZIPRA Commander Sibhona, the MK guerrillas were expected to bolster the ZIPRA forces at Assembly Point Juliet, because they were being outnumbered on a ratio of 3:1 by the ZANLA combatants. Among the MK guerrillas who were part of the twenty-five ZIPRA cadres was Kenneth Phiri and “Morris”, who were given a separate briefing by “Obadi” on that they were joining ZIPRA in order to gain experience, assess the situation in Zimbabwe, and generally reconnoitre areas that MK may possibly use in the future. After the briefings, the twenty-five were taken to Livingstone, and then to a point near Kazungula, where they crossed the Zambezi into Botswana.

On 25 February 1980, at the apartheid South African Defence Force (SADF) Headquarters, in Pretoria, twenty-three representatives of the SADF met their counterparts from the Rhodesian Defence Force. The Director-General of combined operations in the SADF, Brigadier L. Jacobs, briefed them on the elections that were in progress in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. He then mentioned that of the fourteen assembly points, those in the west were occupied by ZIPRA, those in the east by ZANLA, and those in the south jointly by ZIPRA and ZANLA.

Brigadier Jacobs predicted that if ZANU lost the election, ZANLA was likely to resume the war, and to counter this, the Rhodesian Security Forces has planned to deploy their troops during the night of 29 February 1980 in preparation for possible action, codenamed “Operation Melba”. Furthermore, Brigadier Jacobs added that after Assembly Points Juliet and Kilo had merged, it was anticipated that there was going to be about 200 ANC “terrorists” there. Therefore, if ZANU rejected the election results and resorted to arms, then under the Melba Plan, the attack on Juliet would be designated to the SADF, with all other assaults being conducted by the Rhodesian forces. Accordingly, the apartheid South African Air Force was expected to assist in the attacks on the other assembly points.

Following the results of the Zimbabwe’s independence elections on 5 March 1980, with ZANU-PF winning overwhelmingly, “Operation Melba” was rendered void. However, on 17 March 1980, the Northern Transvaal Command of the South African Army had received information that MK “terrorists” were being deployed together with ZIPRA forces in Zimbabwe’s Gokwe area where they had 100 cadres, and also at Essexvale camp, an estimated 50 MK “terrorists” had been integrated with the Rhodesian Security Forces and were undergoing training. In the Tuli/Beitbrigde area, there were a further 175 “terrorists”, according to the report.

Again, on the same day, 17 March 1980, another report from the Northern Transvaal Command quoted a source in Zimbabwe that ZAPU’s Dumiso Dabengwa had acknowledged that there were 200 ANC “terrorists” in Assembly Point Juliet during the election period, and that 150 of them had proceeded to the Hwali, Dendele and Hunga areas after the polls. Since intelligence had leaked that ZIPRA was keeping MK combatants, Dabengwa then suggested that ZIPRA Commanders should remove them. After speaking to ZANU leader, Robert Mugabe, Dabengwa called to say there were high chances that Assembly Point Juliet, at Zezani, could be bombed by the South African apartheid regime.

Dabengwa apparently told the ANC guerrillas to stop their movements in Zimbabwe and return to Botswana. Despite this instruction, 150 were still large with ZIPRA forces in the Masera and Machekhuta Tribal Trust Lands. According to the report, Dabengwa made these comments on 14 March 1980, when he spoke to the source, and ex-Rhodesian member of the Zimbabwe’s Special Branch.

ZIPRA Commander Sibhona, later confirmed that there were 112 MK combatants at the Juliet and Kilo Assembly Points. Sibhona decided with Dutsa, his front intelligence officer, that of the 112 MK combatants, they should declare only 88 and leave the other 24 who were already prepared to gain access into South Africa through Zimbabwe. Eventually the 88 MK cadres were taken back to Zambia while 24 were left in Zimbabwe, who managed to melt into Bulawayo.

Following the disbandment of Assembly Point Juliet, on 2 April 1980, most MK cadres returned to Zambia, except a group of eight guerrillas, including Thomas “Victor” Hlabane (aka “Buti Barks”, who had been involved in operations attached to the ZIPRA call-sign for several years), Madimetsa Ranoto, Ali Makhobokana Makhosini, “Parker”, “Roger”, “Themba”, “Vusi” and “Sizwe”, who instead departed to Bulawayo, where they were accommodated by ZIPRA cadres.

Likewise, after Raymond Zulu had been demobilised from Juliet, rather than head back to Zambia, he was assisted by a ZIPRA combatant to go to Plumtree, where he found accommodation with ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union) supporters. Similarly, Kenneth Phiri and “Morris” headed to Bulawayo along with ZIPRA combatants who assisted them in finding local accommodation.

THE OBJECTIVE WAS CLEAR, “SOY’WELA I-LIMPOPO, MAGUERRILLA!”.

Sources:
Sunday News Correspondent, “Interview with Cde Irvine Khulekani Sibhona: Umkhonto we Sizwe Cadres Moved into Assembly Points Disguised as ZPRA”, Sunday News (Zimbabwe), 17 Jul 2022.
Ronnie Kasrils, “Umkhonto We Sizwe: How the Armed Struggle Succeeded”, The African Communist, Issue Number 194, 1st Quarter 2017.
Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, “The Travelling Toyi-Toyi: Soldiers and the Politics of Drill”, The Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 46, Issue No. 5, 2020.
African National Congress, “Further Submissions and Responses by the African National Congress to Questions Raised by the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation”, 12 May 1997.
Martyn Gregory, “From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: An Analysis of the 1980 Elections and an Assessment of the Prospects”, Occasional Paper – The South African Institute of International Affairs, May 1980.
Thula Simpson, “Umkhonto we Sizwe: The ANC’s Armed Struggle”, Penguin, 2016.
Stanley Manong, “If We Must Die: An Autobiography of a Former Commander of uMkhonto we Sizwe”, Nkululeko, 2015.

Castro Khwela
Good evening fellow Compatriots!