Minister of Defence P.W. Botha and Rebuilding the SA Defence Industry

Minister of Defence P.W. Botha and Rebuilding the SA Defence Industry

“South Africa had taken part in a secret international conference ‘at service level’ with friendly nations of the Southern Hemisphere about joint defence of sea routes. … It is our duty to be ready for anything in the light of continual meddling in South Africa’s domestic affairs, threats of sanctions and boycotts, and open animosity in certain circles.”

– Defence Minister P.W. Botha (Parliament 1968) –

On 12 March 1968, apartheid Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, reported to the lower house of Parliament, the Senate, on the Arms Industry and defined the main aims of South Africa’s defence policy. The paranoia that afflicted the Apartheid State regarding a potential uprising by Black South Africans, who were purportedly supported by the Soviet Union and the reluctance of Western Governments to supply South Africa with arms convinced the racist regime that it needed to develop its own means of producing and servicing its armed forces.

These included the provision of manufacturing capabilities regarding nuclear arms, ammunition, aeronautics and armour. Having been in power in South Africa since 1948, the National Party, had entrenched a policy of “apartheid” as a political, social, legal and constitutional system, which was maintained through an aggressive expansion of the government’s military industrial complex, with brutal suppression of all opposition against apartheid.

South Africa was well into a civil nuclear research and development programme by the end of the 1960s. It continued to be an important supplier of uranium to the Western nuclear powers since the Second World War. Nuclear activities included, among others, the building of the “Pelindaba” research complex close to the capital, Pretoria; the installation of a small United States-supplied research reactor (Safari-1), along with provision of research quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for its operation; planning for the construction of a nuclear power station at Koeberg on the west coast of South Africa; theorising about peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs) mimicking the United States’ “Plowshare Project” of developing and testing nuclear explosive devices for civil construction applications; and developing a uranium enrichment process – which became a crucial step towards the development of nuclear weapons.

In 1974, a decision was taken to build a single PNE device earmarked for testing at an underground site under construction in the Kalahari Desert. In 1977, gripped in a war against Soviet and Cuban-backed forces in Angola, a decision was taken to construct a top-secret, small nuclear weapons arsenal as a deterrent against what the apartheid government perceived as a “communist onslaught” in decolonising Southern Africa.

Between 1979 and 1989, six nuclear bombs were constructed before a decision was taken in late 1989 to secretly destroy the arsenal, following an end to the border war with Angola, the independence of South African-occupied Namibia, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the imminent democratisation of South Africa, amongst other contributing factors; and building a uranium enrichment process – which was a crucial step towards the development of nuclear weapons.

In 1966 – 1967, South Africa’s military expenditure had risen from £22 million in 1960 – 1961, to around £127.5 million, which was approximately 12% of South Africa’s total budget. By 1967, the permanent force of 17 276 men was supplemented by a Citizen Force of over 80 000 trained reservists, with more being trained at the rate of some 25 000 men per annum.

The United Nations Security Council recommended an international embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa in 1963, with the United States and the United Kingdom agreeing to implement the embargo in September 1963 and November 1964 respectively, as traditional arms suppliers to the racist government. However, other countries, such as France, rejected the UN Resolution outright, and West Germany, which claimed that it supplied arms for external defence only and not for internal suppression, rushed to fill the gap. Prime Minister B.J. Vorster and his henchmen apparently found little difficulty in buying as many armoured vehicles and aircraft, even rockets and submarines that they needed.

According to the defence minister P.W. Botha, army equipment included American Sherman and British Comet and Centurion tanks; British Ferret and French Panhard armoured vehicles; Swedish Bofor and Swiss Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns; British Green Archer and Swiss Fledermaus radar equipment; and Belgian FN 7.62 automatic rifles. Some of this equipment was bought from Britain and America before the embargo came into force – but in some cases at least, such as the Saracen armoured cars that were used by the apartheid police force, spare parts continued to be supplied in spite of the embargo.

Other items were obtained through third countries, which themselves manufactured under licence, or through one of the international arms dealers who had discovered loopholes in such controls that existed for the regulation of the arms trade. However, the Panhard car and the FN rifles were actually manufactured in South Africa under licence from the French and Belgian owners; and in May 1965, the Minister of Defence was able to boast that he acquired one hundred and twenty-seven licences for local manufacture of foreign arms and ammunition.

The South African Navy comprised over 30 vessels, including two re-fitted destroyers carrying naval helicopters, maritime strike aircraft and reconnaissance planes; four anti-submarine frigates; and a tanker, the “Annam”, 12 000 tons, which was bought from Denmark in May 1965. The apartheid government had also signed an agreement with France, in April 1967, enabling it to order 3 Daphne-type deep-diving submarines. In the same year, the Ministry of Defence announced that a British Decca radio navigational system capable of determining the position of vessels at sea to within 25 yards, was to be installed to cover the coast from South West Africa round to Natal.

The South African Air Force had one squadron of Sabre Mk 6 interceptors, which were designed in the United States, but manufactured in Canada; 16 Mirage 111C2 supersonic jet strike fighter bombers, equipped with AS-30 air-to-surface missiles, which were bought from France in 1963; and two squadrons of Mirage 111E2 intruder fighters that were delivered in 1965 – 1966; as well as “a small number” of Mirage R2 jets, special reconnaissance models. Pre-embargo purchases also included a squadron of British Canberra B12 light bombers, eight Shackleton maritime recon aircraft, several American Cessna 185 Skywagon jet recon aircraft, and five Lockheed Hercules C130 –8 transports bought from the United States in 1962 – 1963 just prior to the embargo.

16 Blackburn Buccaneer low level strike bombers were delivered in 1965 – 1966, which were specifically excluded from the arms embargo when it was imposed by the British Government in 1964. In addition, the Air Force operated Nord Transall troop carriers, which were French manufactured with West German components, and over 60 helicopters, mostly French Aloutte and S.A. 3210 Super Frelon; and a few British Westland Wasp and United States Sikorsky.

Marcel Dessault, the French firm that made the Mirages and Mysteres, complained in 1966 that it had been prevented from selling a further three Mystere 20 executive jets to South Africa, because the United States state department refused to authorise the export of American components, which included the engine, electrical equipment, wheels and brakes. A similar refusal by the State Department destroyed a similar British deal in December 1967.

Nevertheless, no British scruples inhibited the sale of three Mystere 205 planes with British Hawker-Siddely engines in 1965; nor the arrangement, also made in 165, whereby a new local manufacturing corporation, Atlas Aircraft, was to build 300 Italian 326 jet trainers, which became known in South Africa as Impalas, that had British Bristol Viper jet engines, and that were built under licence in Italy by Piaggo Aircraft.

The development of South Africa’s “own” arms and aircraft industries was thus emerging as the most important means of evading the effect of the UN embargo call. Evasion involved the collaboration of companies in countries which publicly ignored the embargo, such as France and Italy, but also of several British and American companies.

A British company, the giant Imperial Chemical Industries, which had, incidentally, two British Government-appointed directors on its board, had a half-share in African Explosives and Chemical Industries, the South African company that had built three munitions factories to make tear gas and small-arms munitions for the apartheid South African Defence Force (SADF). Another British company, Rolls Royce, supplied the engines for Rotocraft Ltd, one of the aircraft manufacturing companies that had set up to make two-seater gyroplanes in South Africa.

Two United States companies, the Maulle company and the Meyers Aircraft Company of Michigan, signed contracts with C.R. Jansen Aviation Ltd, to assemble a four-seater Meyers passenger plane that could take off within 90 feet for the apartheid police, a four-seater trainer for the military, and Maulle Rocket short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft. Another US company, Afic Holdings (Pty) Ltd, was to build Italian light aircraft in South Africa, the Afic RSA 200, which was an all-metal single-engine four-seater with a cruising speed of 160 mph. There was therefore no reluctance among the arms producers of the West to keep apartheid well-equipped with the means of suppression and possibly of aggression against free African states.

South Africa was already playing a decisive part in perpetuating the racist Smith regime in Zimbabwe. British Saracens were being used by the apartheid police there, and the Atlas Corporation was supplying Rhodesia with aircraft, such as the Aermacchi Lockheed 60, a light utility transport plane with a US-developed engine. South African troops in Zimbabwe were also using French Aloutte helicopters that were repainted in Rhodesian colours, and at least two spotter planes that were operated along the Zambezi from the airport at Kariba.

In order to bypass the embargo, the apartheid government chose their moment carefully, so as to exploit to the full Britain’s economic crisis. As Prime Minister Vorster put it in November 1967, “Given Britain’s financial and economic crisis, the sanctions programme against Rhodesia and the arms embargo against South Africa are two luxuries she can no longer afford”.

History has shown that apartheid South Africa was successful in accomplishing most of its ambitions in building a formidable defence industry. Unfortunately, the greatest threat to apartheid was not military in nature, but a political and social one, which comprised of people and organisations within and outside South Africa, exerting pressure on the state to eventually abandon apartheid.

Writing in 1969, Abdul Minty maintained that “It is ultimately the oppressed people in Southern Africa who will, by their own struggle, themselves overthrow white supremacy and win liberation. In an effort to minimize human suffering, the Liberation Movement has urged international supporting action to help end apartheid, but at the United Nations and elsewhere Western Governments have successfully blocked all meaningful action to counteract apartheid. Simultaneously, growing internal repression within South Africa has forced the oppressed majority to resort to armed struggle” (1969).

Sources:
South African History Online (SAHO).
Editorial, “Those Who Arm Our Enemies Are Our Enemies”, Sechaba, Vol. 2, No. 3, March 1968.
Editorial, “South Africa’s Dilemma”, Sechaba, Vol. 2, No. 9, September 1968.
Abdul S. Minty, “South Africa’s Defence Strategy”, Anti-Apartheid Movement, October 1969.
Anna-Mart van Wyk, “Chapter 9: Abdul Samad Minty and the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa”, Luc-André Brunet and Eirini Karamouzi (Eds.), “Beyond the Euromissile Crisis: Global Histories of Anti-Nuclear Activism in the Cold War”, Series: Protest, Culture & Society, Vol. 33, Berghahn Books, 2025.

Castro Khwela
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