The Callous Murder of Cassius Maake and Paul Dikeledi

The Callous Murder of Cassius Maake and Paul Dikeledi

On 9 July 1987, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) Regional Chief of Operations, Paul Dikeledi (real name Peter Sello Motau) welcomed the African National Congress (ANC) National Executive Committee (NEC) member, Cassius Maake (real name Job Shimankana Tabane), and Eliza Tsineni Augusto, a Mozambican national and ANC supporter, as they arrived at Matsapha Airport, in Swaziland, on a Lesotho Airways flight from Mozambique.

The three then got into a Colt Gallant with a “Maza Taxi” sticker imprinted on its doors, as they were driven away by the taxi driver, Sipho Gamedze. As the taxi took a turn to the University of Swaziland, a white BMW with Transvaal number plates was following behind. When the taxi passed the Usushwana Bridge near the Swazi King Mswati II’s royal palace, the BMW flashed its lights, which prompted the Colt Gallant to stop. Immediately the occupants of the BMW rushed out of the car and began spraying the taxi with gunfire, instantly killing Augusto, Maake and Dikeledi, but sparing Gamedze. The entire incident occurred in broad daylight.

The same apartheid Security Police officers who were involved in the murder of Theophilus “Viva” Dlodlo were involved, and these were Colonel Johan Botha and Warrant Officer Lappies Labuschagne, belonging to the Security Branch of Middleburg. The two police officers moved to a flat next to Sheila Nyanda’s, and were pretending to be South African university students on a break in Swaziland. And on 24 May 1987, two days after the ambush and murder of “Viva”, they abducted Nyanda from Swaziland, who was the wife of Siphiwe “Gebhuza” Nyanda. The white BMW 3 series that was used in the mission to kill Maake and Dikeledi was the one that belonged to Nyanda and was stolen by Botha and Labuschagne while it was parked in a carport next to her apartment.

In all of these assassinations, security police informers played important roles. Evidence before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) revealed that Gamedze was an informer and that he stopped his taxi at a prearranged isolated spot before collecting the targetted individuals. Eugene de Kock linked an informer code-named “Rasta” to Viva’s killing.

Moreover, the ANC included the confession of Nompumelelo Zakade as one of its case studies of confessions by agents. She was said to have provided information for the killings of Viva and Dikeledi and others. Zakade was told by Paul Dikeledi, about two days before his death, that there was an important person, Maake, arriving from Maputo. She later overheard a telephone message from Maputo that this person was arriving on Thursday and that he should be met at the airport. She duly informed her handler, Ronnie Nel, about this.

Cassius Maake was elected to the NEC of the ANC at the Kabwe Conference in June 1985, and became the youngest member, together with Pallo Jordan, to serve in the NEC. He also served as a member of the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party (SACP). Maake was the ANC’s Chief Representative in Angola in 1976 and was redeployed to Lusaka Zambia in 1978 where served as the Deputy Secretary of the Revolutionary Council (RC). During this period he was also appointed Chief of Ordinance and later served in the ANC’s Politico Military Council (PMC).

Paul Dikeledi, on the other hand, became the Secretary for the Regional Military Committee (RMC) in 1977 under the Chairpersonship of Joe Slovo, which was responsible for the Mozambique and Swaziland front into South Africa, mainly the MK Transvaal and Natal Machineries. In 1978 he became a member of the Mozambique-Swaziland Regional Political Bureau of the SACP. During 1981 when the ANC structures were reorganised, he became a member of the Regional Political Military Committee (RPMC), which combined the political and military machineries operating inside the country.

Paul rose through the ranks of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and ran the ANC machinery in the then Transvaal while based in Swaziland. As the Regional Chief of Operations, he was also responsible for the Eastern Front operations via Swaziland. In the beginning of April 1986, landmine operations were coordinated by the Transvaal Implementation Machinery of MK, which met in Swaziland, under the leadership Paul Dikeledi. This Machinery was a structure to coordinate the activities of the ANC’s political and military, rural and urban structures for the Transvaal. The meeting was arranged because Dikeledi had received orders from ANC Headquarters, in Lusaka, that the Swaziland Regional Politico-Military Committee (RPMC) and the Transvaal and Natal Implementation Machineries, had to commence with landmine warfare.

In its submission to the TRC, the ANC maintained that “the enemy also went to considerable lengths to infiltrate agents into all organisations considered to be in the enemy camp, particularly the ANC and MK. No effort was spared to penetrate our structures at all levels of the Movement. The failure to pick up enemy agents in time resulted in serious setbacks and losses. … Analysis of the missions of agents who were captured and confessed, or who voluntarily confessed, shows that the primary areas of interest of the enemy were the gathering of information on the movements of leadership figures; infiltration routes into South Africa; MK operational plans; lines of communication and means of transport…”

Furthermore, the ANC asserted that “We lost many committed and talented leaders and cadres through the activities of such agents, as in the cases of Zweli Nyanda, Joe Gqabi, Paul Dikeledi, and Cassius Make to mention just a few. Some agents were tasked not only with passing on information of this nature, but also with carrying out acts such as poisoning and sabotage of essential equipment. Others were trained in the psychological warfare field; their work aimed at destroying the ANC from within, and they usually took on the role of agent provocateur. They sought to damage MK and the ANC in general through stirring up dissent, tribalism or other forms of factionalism, spreading false rumours, encouraging general demoralisation, creating suspicion within structures, damaging relationships, and instigating or encouraging acts of indiscipline. Given the conditions under which the ANC was operating, such acts could be highly dangerous and destructive.”

“Our Commanders’ lives will always be remembered!
Hamba kahle Mkhonto!”

Sources:
Wikipedia.
South African History Online (SAHO).
African National Congress, “Further Submissions and Responses by the African National Congress to Questions Raised by the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation”, 12 May 1997.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Amnesty Decisions: Siphiwe Nyanda, Solly Zacharia Shoke, Malekolle Johannes Rasegatla”, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Amnesty Committee, Cape Town, 16 May 2000.
Janet Smith and Beauregard Tromp, “Hani: A Life Too Short”, Jonathan Ball, 2009.
Jacob Dlamini, “Askari: A Story of Collaboration and Betrayal in the Anti-apartheid Struggle”, Jacana, 2014.
Thula Simpson, “Umkhonto we Sizwe: The ANC’s Armed Struggle”, Penguin, 2016.
Stephen Ellis, “External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960–1990”, Jacana, 2012.
Vladimir Shubin, “ANC: A View from Moscow”, Jacana, 2008.
Hugh Macmillan, “The Lusaka Years: The ANC in Exile in Zambia, 1963 to 1994”, Jacana, 2013.

Castro Khwela
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