Umkhonto we Sizwe Cadres Removed from Kongwa

Umkhonto we Sizwe Cadres Removed from Kongwa

On 1 September 1969, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) approved the prolonged stay and training of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) cadres in the Soviet Union following their immediate removal from Kongwa, Tanzania, in July 1969. Some of the fighters had to be enrolled in Soviet universities and vocational schools, after some convincing by the then Chairperson of the South African Communist Party (SACP), J.B. Marks, that they needed to understand the conditions that the African National Congress (ANC) was facing with the challenges experienced with the Tanzanian government at the time.

On 19 July 1969, the ANC Headquarters in Morogoro received a visit from the Tanzanian government ordering it to vacate its military cadres from Kongwa within fourteen days, with the reason that the MK men had been there for a long time and as such they constituted a security risk. In addition, the letter threatened that if the ANC was unable to infiltrate its cadres into South Africa within the given timeframe, Tanzanian authorities would be left with no choice but to send them to a refugee camp. “In other words, this meant the liquidation of Umkhonto we Sizwe”. At the ANC Conference in Kabwe in 1985, Oliver Tambo was more forthright, “In 1969 as a result of complications that our movement faced in this region, we had to evacuate [most of] our army to the Soviet Union at very short notice. Our Soviet comrades then worked with us to prepare the comrades who returned home in 1972.”

In the period immediately before the Morogoro Conference, “the era of the Lusaka Manifesto”, the ANC was faced with distressing developments as some African independent states proposed compromises with the apartheid Pretoria regime at the Movement’s expense. The Lusaka Manifesto on South Africa was approved by a conference of Eastern and Central African states in Lusaka, on 14 to 16 April 1969. During the conference, member states confirmed their determination towards the liberation of southern Africa, while paradoxically stating their readiness to normalise relations with colonial and racist regimes in the region.

The Lusaka Manifesto therefore represented one of two strategies to deal with white minority rule in Southern Africa, to try to contain violence, preserve the status quo, and improve the humanitarian situation little by little through diplomatic means, small reforms, and compromises. The stated aim of the member states was to persuade the liberation movements “to desist from their armed struggle” if the colonial and racist regimes recognised the “principle of human equality” and the right to self-determination. Ultimately, the Lusaka Manifesto was used by collaborator governments, such as President Banda of Malawi, to justify their policy of engagement with the apartheid South African regime.

As a background to this Manifesto, the apartheid regime became increasingly politically isolated both internationally and continentally in the late 1960s. As a result, apartheid Prime Minister B.J. Vorster developed what was called an “outward-looking policy”, in which the racist regime attempted to bind southern African countries economically, accordingly discouraging them from openly criticising its repressive policies. However, this policy was initially opposed only by the Tanzanian and Zambian governments under president Mwalimu Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda respectively, which resulted in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) rejecting any further engagements with the apartheid South African regime.

During that period the national liberation movements were already active in all white-ruled territories of Southern Africa, including the Portuguese-run colonial territories. Most of these movements were explicitly committed to armed struggles, including sabotage and guerrilla warfare. In South Africa, the ANC had launched its military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in 1961. It immediately executed several sabotage acts against the country’s infrastructure and was in 1967 to 1968 operating jointly with the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) in the Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns in Rhodesia. Meanwhile, in South-West Africa, the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) had established its own paramilitary wing, SWALA (South West African Liberation Army), in 1962, which later became the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) that undertook its first military action in Omugulugwombashe in 1966.

The reason for joint MK-ZIPRA campaigns in Rhodesia was because apartheid South Africa was both politically and militarily strong at the time in its borders it was covered by states that were all ruled by white minorities except Botswana, with smaller states, Lesotho and Swaziland, being largely dependent on Soth Africa since their respective independence in 1966 and 1968. The United States had already declared under Memorandum 39, nicknamed the “Tar Baby Memorandum”, under President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, that the white populations in southern Africa were there to stay. Moreover, the United States’ reluctant acceptance of apartheid and white minority rule in order to strengthen its anti-communist bastion in Southern Africa, strengthened the racist and colonial regimes’ position internationally.

Exploiting these United States succoured favourable conditions, the Vorster regime held secret conversations with Kaunda for some time since 1968, which eventually led to the initiation of the Lusaka Manifesto. Prime Minister Vorster threatened to reveal the content of his conversations with Kaunda in order to influence his stance in publicly representing apartheid South African policies globally. When Kaunda did not respond or react positively to the threats, Vorster published the complete exchange and later in 1970 confirmed their existence and authenticity in the South African parliament.

What was contained in the manifesto was a declaration on human rights and equality, as well as the specific rejection of racial discrimination, which was then existing as white minority racism in the two Portugues colonies and in Rhodesia, South West Africa and specifically in South Africa. The Manifesto further offered possibilities for dialogue to the White regime in South Africa, stating that the signatories would “negotiate rather than destroy, talk rather than kill”. Nevertheless, the liberalism expressed in the document was in direct opposition to apartheid South Africa’s stance, which saw rights and liberties of individual people as tantamount to communism, and as irreconcilable with its own nationalist policies.

With reference to South West Africa (Namibia), Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola, the document called for self-determination and the establishment of majority rule. For South Africa its tone was sharper, and its recommendations went much further, including the suggestion to expel South Africa from all international political and economic bodies. This distinction between the suggested treatment of South Africa and the other white-ruled territories also contained an acknowledgement of South Africa’s status as an independent, sovereign United Nations member, while Namibia, Mozambique, Rhodesia and Angola were colonies without recognition as states.

The Lusaka Manifesto, was believed to have been largely authored by Julius Nyerere, was endorsed by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and by the 24th session of the UN General Assembly, as Western and former colonial powers in Europe positively received its reportedly diplomatic tone. Indeed, it was a document in the moderate line of thought on how to improve the situation of Blacks in Southern Africa, as it acknowledged the right of all the whites who had settled in southern Africa to stay there. Moreover, it recognised South Africa as a sovereign and independent state and proposed no changes of boundaries. Furthermore, it advocated boycott and isolation, rather than armed intervention or internal revolt, in South Africa. Ultimately, and above all else, it urged negotiation and accepted that change could not come overnight.

What bothered the ANC and other liberation movements was the fact that decisions affecting their countries and peoples were taken without their knowledge and participation. It was also criticised for not involving any of the contemporary liberation movements and, more generally, of entrenching capitalism on the African continent rather than supporting the various socialist movements of that time. During the same period, the ANC was faced with faltering relations in some of these African countries, especially following the apparent disappointments of the Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns, MK lost its capacity to operate from Zambian territory.

Despite the fact that the white South African racist regime rejected the document, the ANC was likewise opposed to it, since in their view the declaration legitimised the apartheid regime, pronouncing its status as a sovereign and independent United Nations-recognised entity. The ANC further rejected the call for a peaceful resolution of the difficulties in South Africa, since the Vorster regime had intervened militarily in Rhodesia following the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns, and that the Manifesto’s wording artificially separated the liberation struggles in South Africa, South-West Africa, and Rhodesia.

According to a 1971 statement issued by the ANC, “It is a tragedy that now – when black South Africa is launching an unflinching, full scale armed struggle against Vorster and his henchmen – African States … have seen it fit to have a ‘dialogue’ with white South Africa […] If there should be a dialogue it should be between Voster and the real leaders of the people, Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki, Kathrada, Fischer, Motsoaledi … We must repeat what we have always adhered to, namely that the responsibility for freeing our country is our own and that we must face the dangers and difficulties inherent in the course we have chosen. But it is also evident to us that the cooperation of other African states is vital both for material and moral support without which our struggle will be seriously hampered.”

The main disappointment for the ANC, though, was that its armed struggle, and that of its like-minded liberation movements, such as Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO), the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and SWAPO, was not directly supported and was rather seen as a possible future legitimate action, even if it already was in full operation. For MK combatants, such as Chris Hani, watching from the sidelines, disillusioned but still involved in the history unfolding before them, they tried to make sense of the politics in play.

During an interview on the Lusaka Manifesto, Chris Hani was documented as saying, “We were all bitter about the Lusaka Manifesto, about the negotiations between Kaunda and Vorster. But we thought it would be wrong to denounce Kaunda for a number of reasons. Though he was continuing with his negotiations, he was keeping us in Zambia, and for us this was important. So, we had to weigh up our priorities. We thought, let him; he was entitled to do what he was doing, but basically, it was important for us to retain Zambia as a base for the ANC in order to continue with our strategy. That was Kaunda’s strategy. He was not hostile to the ANC because he was talking to Vorster.”

Furthermore, Hani maintained that “We felt let down. We would have preferred a situation where Africa would totally isolate the apartheid regime. Because this was our strategy, that South Africa must be isolated continentally and internationally. But we knew that some African leaders were having secret talks with the regime because of their dependence on South Africa economically, and [the fact that] they traded South African goods. I think Kaunda this time had problems with Smith, because Smith had declared unilateral independence, and Zambia had closed its borders and everything with Smith. I think he was playing South Africa against Zimbabwe in order to ensure that Zambia, which was a landlocked country, did not suffer the long-term effects of the blockade that Zambia, with the support of the international community, had imposed on Zimbabwe.”

For the ANC, “the prospect of a severe armed struggle is a serious challenge, but the vision of a country free from oppression is a spur to the revolutionary action that must be pursued”. This was a very difficult period for the ANC within the Front-Line States. Moreover, the presence of non-Africans and communists within the ANC was viewed with suspicion by several of these states and particularly some members of the Tanzanian leadership. With regard to the latter, the role of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), particularly Potlako Leballo, could not be overlooked, as the PAC had strong influence within the Tanzanian leadership, especially due to their mutual relations with China, and the impact of Sino-Soviet tensions.

South African pressure in line with the Lusaka Manifesto was apparently one of the main reasons for a sudden decision to close ANC camps in Tanzania, but the role of the PAC’s Leballo could not be taken for granted, as he influenced those in Tanzanian ruling circles who were hostile to the ANC that MK cadres would support a coup attempt, when he was a state witness during the trial of former Tanzanian Foreign Minister, Oscar Kambona (then Liberation Committee Chairperson). There were rumours that one of the ways he enriched himself when he was in office was by taking some money that was intended to go to the liberation movement in Tanzania.

Later, in October 1969, Oscar Kambona, who had held several portfolios in the post-independent Tanzanian government, as a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs and Defence, alongside other Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) members were charged with treason. Kambona was accused of working with the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to overthrow the government of Tanzania and to assassinate Julius Nyerere. Leballo testified that Kambona had tried to enlist him as a co-conspirator. During the trial Leballo alleged that the ANC was also involved in plotting the coup, and, as a consequence, the Tanzanian government was enraged and expelled the ANC from Tanzania. The ANC was forced to close its camps in Tanzania and evacuate its military personnel to the Soviet Union, with assistance from the latter.

The concerns of the ANC leadership were clearly expressed by President Oliver Tambo and Secretary General Alfred Nzo when they visited Moscow in April 1970 during Lenin’s centenary celebrations, wherein they candidly described their growing difficulties in the region. Soon after the receipt of the Tanzanian government order to remove MK cadres from Kongwa, Soviet authorities requested permission to land transport planes in order to conduct an airlift of MK guerrillas out of the country. Special flights were arranged to transport MK fighters from Dar es Salaam to Simferopol and elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Eventually, the ANC moved its headquarters from Morogoro to Lusaka in Zambia.

Unfortunately, not a single African country was ready to replace Tanzania in providing camps for MK cadres, and many dozens of MK members were flown urgently in special flights (Ilyushin-18 planes of the OKABON, the Independent Red Banner Special Purpose Air Brigade), from Dar es Salaam to the USSR, mostly to the centre near Simferopol. This demonstrated the importance of Soviet assistance to the liberation struggle in South Africa. The decision to accommodate the bulk of MK cadres was not an easy one for the Soviet leadership. Moscow had agreed to provide them with military training six years earlier, but now it had to maintain them almost permanently, without any clear plans for their return to Africa. Indeed, it soon became obvious that their return to Africa would be delayed and the ANC leadership requested that the course of retraining be extended.

Even though the ANC was readmitted into Tanzania between 1971 and 1972, the clampdown by the Tanzanian government momentarily damaged relations between the two. When Reddy Mampane was appointed as the ANC’s Chief Representative to Tanzania in 1976, relations between the government and the ANC were still frosty. Despite this setback, South African refugees continued to arrive in Tanzania and their numbers swelled, particularly after 1976, and relations improved enormously leading to the establishment of educational and military training facilities in the late 1970s and 1980s. Relations between ANC President Oliver Tambo and Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere were forever cordial and brotherly, and the Tanzanian government honoured its unswerving commitments towards the liberation of southern Africa, and particularly South Africa.

The lesson for the ANC with regard to the episode of the Lusaka Manifesto and the subsequent decision for MK to be evacuated from Kongwa, was that “much as one valued one’s good friends and was grateful to them, the ANC should never relinquish the lead in the liberation struggle. Only that organisation knew the enemy; only that movement could appreciate the extent to which strategic, diplomatic nuances could be employed, and assess their place at any given moment in the revolutionary struggle.”

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