Apartheid State Security Council Approves Cross-Border Operations

Apartheid State Security Council Approves Cross-Border Operations

On 12 February 1979, the apartheid State Security Council (SSC), under the Prime Ministership of PW Botha, approved guidelines for the conducting of military operations against liberation movements in foreign countries. Botha himself chaired the SSC, which was serviced by a secretariat of 100 full-time staff seconded by other government departments. The Departments of Defence, Police and Foreign Affairs drew up the memorandum, which contained provisions for planned operations, cross-border (“hot pursuit”) raids, reconnaissance and clandestine operations.

In October 1978, prior to the issuing of the SSC guidelines, Deputy Defence and Intelligence Minister, Kobie Coetsee, was appointed by PW Botha to lead a commission of inquiry into intelligence gathering and to determine which would be the lead agency, in particular. Since PW Botha was a former Minister of Defence, it was assumed that it was already decided that the Directorate Military Intelligence (DMI) would be the lead intelligence agency. Botha had decided to split the intelligence gathering capability amongst four agencies, the DMI, the Bureau for State Security (BOSS), the Security Branch and Foreign Affairs, hoping to reduce political dominance by one over the others.

The SSC was formed in South Africa in 1972 to advise the government on the country’s national policy and strategy concerning security, its implementation, and determining security priorities. The Security Intelligence and State Security Council of 1972 called for the following persons to be members of the SSC: Ministers Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Police (Law and Order), Chiefs of the Defence Force and South African Police (SAP), Director-General of BOSS, which was later changed to the National Intelligence Agency (NIS), as well as the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and Justice. Provision was also made for the invitation of anyone else required to aid the discussions.

The SSC had four divisions: the Strategy Planning Branch, which developed the national government’s strategy; Strategic Communications (Stratkom), to discredit other organisations and neutralise anti-apartheid propaganda; the National Intelligence Interpretation Branch (NIIB), to coordinate the gathering and interpretation of intelligence; and the Administration Branch.

During the Prime Ministership of PW Botha (who later became an executive State President), the SSC controlled all aspects of South African public’s lives by becoming the de-facto Cabinet, whereas it was one of the four Cabinet committees (the other three for constitutional matters, economic and welfare issues). Botha described the Westminster system as not appropriate for the country, as it gave more authority to the legislature. Therefore, it was necessary to strengthen the executive, integrate the state’s resources and overhaul the state’s political and administrative structures.

Botha then implemented a “Total National Strategy” and on 16 August 1979 established the National Security Management System (NSMS), which was intended to develop strategies and policies for combating the “Total Onslaught” against the apartheid state. The NSMS was to integrate the efforts of the entire government and its assets towards protecting the state with the SADF, Police and Intelligence services as the core of the system, and all of them managed by the SSC.

When the SSC issued guidelines for cross-border operations, it also provided for who could authorise external raids by the security forces. Most of the raids fell into a category of planned (“oorwoë” – literally meaning “well-thought-out”) operations which required the assent of the SSC. The explanation presented by the South African Defence Force (SADF) in its submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) suggested that the discretion rested in the hands of the Chairman of the SSC, in consultation with the permanent members of the SSC, or those he decided to involve.

The SSC also managed a “regional strategy for destabilisation”, which was created to prevent the establishment of ANC and PAC (Pan Africanist Congress) bases in neighbouring countries, such as Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, Zambia, Mozambique and later Zimbabwe. In Angola, the strategy was to divide the country, supporting UNITA (The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) secession in the south of the country, which was managed by the SADF and DMI. In Mozambique, it meant propping up RENAMO (the Mozambican National Resistance movement), which was created in 1978 by the Rhodesians in opposition to the Mozambican government, and was placed under SADF control by 1980, to be managed by the DMI’s Directorate of Special Tasks.

Through the SSC, the apartheid security forces carried out a number of attacks on ANC houses in the frontline states during the period PW Botha was the head of state and government. Cross border raids took three basic forms: assassinations through direct attacks, car and parcel bombs; sending in commandos across borders from the SADF or the SA Police’s C10 Vlakplaas Unit to destroy infrastructure and kill political activists; and conduct abductions or kidnappings of political activists who were then secretly transported back to South Africa for interrogation or trial. The activists could also be murdered or turned into “askaris”, former members of the liberation movement converted into state security agents.

In response, the Statement of the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party, November 1979, maintained that: “The ‘total war strategy’ of continuous and increasing aggression that the Prime Minister of fascist South Africa, P.W. Botha, has declared, is designed to meet this situation not only within South Africa but also throughout Southern Africa as one indivisible battlefield. The aims that this strategy pursues are to defeat and destroy the liberation movements in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, to annihilate people’s democracy in Angola and Mozambique and to impose fascist South Africa on the rest of the peoples of Southern Africa as the unchallenged neo-colonialist master” SACP, The African Communist, No. 80, First Quarter 1980.

The TRC castigated warlord apartheid president PW Botha and held him responsible for gross human rights violations, including all violence sanctioned by the State Security Council. As head of state and chairperson of the SSC, Botha contributed to and facilitated a climate in which gross violations of human rights did occur, and as such was held accountable for such violations. The TRC also found that the SSC had contributed to the prevailing culture of impunity by failing to recommend that action be taken against those members of the security forces who were involved in gross human rights violations.

Sources:
Wikipedia
South African History Online (SAHO).
Peter Stiff, “The Silent War: South African Recce Operations 1969 – 1994”.
Niël Barnard, “Secret Revolution: Memoirs of a Spy Boss”.
Paul Holden and Hennie van Vuuren, “The Devil in the Detail: How the Arms Deal Changed Everything”.
Padraig O’Malley, “The Heart of Hope” (The O’Malley Archives).
Stephen R. Davis, “The ANC’s War Against Apartheid: Umkhonto We Sizwe and the Liberation of South Africa”.
TRC Final Report, “Cross-Border Military Operations/Raids”, Volume 2, Chapter 2, Subsection 40.
SACP, “Forward to People’s Power – The Challenge Ahead”, The African Communist, No. 80, First Quarter 1980.

Castro Khwela
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