Wankie – The First Confrontation: The Battle of Inyatuwe River

Wankie – The First Confrontation: The Battle of Inyatuwe River

On 13 August 1967, at approximately 00:30, just after midnight, Patrol Officer Hopkins and an African tracker crossed a dry river stream, the Inyatuwe or Nyatuwe River, ahead of a Unit consisting of Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) troops and some policemen. While Hopkins was crossing the stream, he was fired on from a nearby bush, but the bullets missed him, thus enabling him to run back and to shout a warning to his colleagues who were standing exposed on the river bank.

They then contacted headquarters, where the voice of the Captain of the RAR Unit, Peter Hosking, sounded clearly over the two-way radio, saying “There they are, the bandits”. He then called for urgent helicopter reinforcement, which was to be added to the Provost spotter plane that was hovering above the scene. Following difficulties to spot the “enemy”, the Rhodesian Unit began to open fire from the river bank in the direction from where Patrol Officer Hopkins was fired at.

During that time, “Comrade Rodgers” (real name Freddie Mninzi), who was the third in command of the Lupane Group, lifted his head and saw his comrade manning the guerrillas’ outpost, about twenty metres away, being hit by an enemy bullet. He then saw the Rhodesian forces firing towards the bush from hip position. According to Comrade Rodgers, they had reached the Nyatuwe River stream, which was dry at the time, early in the morning before sunrise on 13 August 1967. After they had established an outpost and detailing some of their comrades for guard duties, he, Masimini and the Lupane Group Commander, Jonathan Moyo (aka “David Madziwa”), left for reconnaissance around the area.

During the reconnaissance process, they realised that a hundred metres from the bush in which they had taken cover, on the north-western side of the river, there was a hillock with huge rocks on top, which was a very strategic position because one could observe all around the area and to spot the enemy from afar. However, they decided against occupying it because of a lack of cover from the air. After scouting the area, they decided to have only one outpost with all-round defence, everybody sleeping at his position.

As the sun was about to rise, they decided to camp there next to the stream with the intention of leaving in the afternoon, clear the area around 16:30, and then continue with the march at 17:30. After they had their breakfast, he went to sleep and was disturbed by a spotter plane that was circling their position at around 07:00. They however decided to ignore it, and at around 08:30, he was woken up again by a deafening salvo of automatic rifles fire from all directions. Listening to the sound of the automatic fire, he was certain that this was not coming from their own forces. He then heard a White man’s voice bellowing, “Surrender Terrorists!”

Comrade Rodgers was pinned down by Rhodesian fire, as bullets hit the sand all around him. He decided to lie flat as some of his comrades fled further into the bush, and others took up combat positions. When the Rhodesian security forces fire became silent, Captain Hosking called out to the guerrillas in English to surrender. One of the African members in patrol repeated the message in IsiNdebele, as the guerrillas responded with a salvo of fire towards the Rhodesian security forces. One of the guerrillas, James Masimini, shouted that he would shoot any “son-of-a-b**ch” that ran away, and further shouted that they should fight back. Masimini was becoming irritated by the other comrades who had merely taken cover and were not firing back at the enemy.

The first Alouette helicopter escorting the reinforcement, which was requested by Captain Hosking landed, out of which Inspector Frederick Phillips, of the Wankie Police Station, stepped out. He was followed by Detective Inspector Reeves and two unarmed plain-clothed African detectives. The second Alouette helicopter consisted of Corporal Davison and four Rhodesian African Rifles troops.

Meanwhile, Comrade Rodgers, who ultimately managed to get up after the guerrillas returned fire, thus compelling the security forces to take cover, led Delmas Sibanyoni and James Masimini across the guerrilla positions, where along the way they encountered Bothwell Tamane (aka “Zami”), single-handedly manning a post in the face of heavy Rhodesian fire. Comrade Rodgers ordered Sibanyoni to support “Zami” with his light machine gun (LMG), but had to wait until the enemy was fifty metres away before firing. He also instructed Sibanyoni to be careful not to exhaust the supplies of ammunition, as the day was still young, saying “Our survival depends on our accuracy”.

The Rhodesian security forces began to break cover, as the order was given to do so, as they ran towards the guerrillas, while firing from the hip. Helicopters were hovering above, covering the advance, and when they were about fifty metres from the guerrilla outpost, Comrade Rodgers ordered his submachine gunners to fire. This reaction forced the security forces to retreat, while Rodgers, Masimini and Tamane began searching for one of the disbanded light machine guns (LMGs). When they found one, Rodgers entrusted it to Tamane, and then they ran in the direction of the hillock.

When they reached the foot of the hillock, one of the helicopters opened fire on them with a 12.7-mm machine gun, thus forcing them to retreat back into the bush. This gave Captain Hosking the opportunity to seize the tactically important hillock, where he led the section of his force indirectly into a south-east direction. When the line nears the southern tip of the ridge, it came under heavy fire from guerrillas who were hidden in the ravine below. The security forces immediately went to ground and returned fire. When Captain Koroni of the RAR tried to lift his head, he was shot behind the left ear and was instantly killed.

Following the seizure of the hillock by Captain Hosking, seeing a white officer pinned down between the rocks, “Comrade Rodgers” ordered Delmas Sibanyoni and Ronnie Dube to concentrate fire on that officer. Rodgers also commanded them to be ready to provide covering fire when necessary. He then took Bothwell Tamane, James Masimini and “Donda” aside, where he assigned them positions on the hillock from where the enemy could be expected to appear.

Comrade Rodgers gave them strict orders to never abandon those positions, as the success of the group’s mission depended on them. One of the three LMGs possessed by the guerrillas was operated by Delmas Sibanyoni, who was firing from the river, thus providing cover for the comrades near the apex of the hillock, as they were trying to seize control of the ridge. One of these comrades, Ronnie Dube, who was operating the second LMG, was using it to take aim at the spotter plane, and the third LMG was operated by James Masimini, who was also on the hillock.

Late that afternoon, one of the guerrillas from the hillock, “Mhambi”, went to report to Comrade Rodgers that both Masimini and Tamane were injured. Masimini’s arm was hit and the bone was pierced through the flesh. Nevertheless, after Masimini’s wound was dressed, he continued firing with his LMG. Meanwhile, Tamane was hit in the leg, but was continuing to fight, despite his injury.

When Mhambi was about to return to the hillock, fresh waves of helicopters began to arrive, thus pinning him down besides Comrade Rodgers. During that time, only Dube’s LMG could be heard firing consistently from the hillock, with Masimini firing intermittently. A few minutes later, Dube’s LMG went silent, leaving only Masimini’s LMG, which was complemented by the rattle of Tamane’s submachine gun.

When nightfall came, at approximately 18:00, combat came to an end, as the group of guerrillas stumbled towards the hillock to retrieve Donda’s remains, as well as an injured Masimini. Donda had been hit by a 12.7-mm machine gun bullet that was fired into his back. At approximately 19:00, in the still of the night, Robert Dube heard whistling from the bush, and followed where it came from. He then found a number of his comrades sitting around the Lupane Group Commander, Jonathan Moyo (aka “David Madziwa”), who told them that three members of the Group had been killed and two were seriously injured. One of the injured was James Masimini, who had lost a great deal of blood, and thus could not move his right arm.

Two of the guerrillas who were manning the Group’s two other LMGs, Delmas Sibanyoni and Ronnie Dube, were dead. Moyo then took the jackets of the dead comrades, Sibanyoni, Dube and Donda, and covered their faces. He then asked the wounded comrades, James Masimini and Joseph Bothwell Ndlovu, about their state of health, and they replied that they were not feeling well. He then ordered them to remain behind, and gave them their guns, to carry on the fight, if needs be. Moyo then took the weapons of the dead, one of them being an LMG, as the other two were destroyed in battle, and gave the LMG to his deputy, Andries Motsepe, as the Lupane Group left the battlefield under the cover of the night, where they decided to rest near a little hill.

This first battle between the joint Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)–Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the armed wing of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), Group and the Rhodesian security forces occurred on 13 August on the banks of the Nyatuwe River, between Wankie and Dete. A Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) patrol consisting of 18 African soldiers and a number of British South African Policemen (BSAP) were following the tracks of the guerrillas and were ambushed at approximately 13:20. After a battle lasting seven and a half hours, the Rhodesian forces fled, losing two African soldiers, two white BSAP officers and a white army officer, in addition to two African soldiers being wounded. When they returned that night to retrieve the bodies of their dead, the Rhodesian forces found five dead guerrillas.

Comrade Rodgers maintained that what enabled the Lupane Group to hold out for the whole day against such heavy odds was the fact that the Rhodesian security forces did not know their strength and it was their first experience to be defied when they commanded “Surrender”, and be replied with fire instead. Never before had they lost such a large number of white soldiers, including commissioned and non-commissioned officers. Those who had second thoughts about this engagement and believed it to be a propaganda exercise could refer to the Rhodesian and South African newspaper articles of the time, as they could not hide their losses.

The court proceedings after the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns also bore witness to this, as a white Captain of the Rhodesia Special Air Services, who claimed to have fought in Malaysia, was on crutches when he went to testify against the joint MK-ZAPU cadres that had been arrested by the Rhodesian security forces. He actually admired and lauded the gallantry of the MK-ZAPU group. In addition, an African Sergeant-Major who was also on crutches during the trial, mentioned that the operation against the guerrillas was the first in which they sustained such heavy losses out of all the operations which he took part in Rhodesia. He even mentioned that a senior white officer, whose rank was not specified, was lying in hospital paralysed.

Another white officer, who gave evidence in another trial, had to be interrupted several times by the Attorney-General because some of his statements were regarded as “damaging to the army”. As a consequence, the judge ordered the media not to report on his testimony. This officer stated that he was not ashamed to say that he ran away and was proud at least that he did not leave his rifle behind like some of his colleagues did.

Indeed, reporting on this battle, Sechaba, the official organ of the African National Congress (ANC) mentioned that two former counter-espionage agents closely connected to Britain’s Security Service, MI-5, in East Africa, who had relocated to Johannesburg, said in an interview published by the Sunday Times in South Africa that the Rhodesian security forces suffered heavy casualties. Soon after the reports of the first battles were reported, that “in actual battles between the security forces and the Mau Mau in Kenya, there were fewer casualties on the Government side than there had been in ‘terrorist’ claims in Rhodesia. This indicates a high degree of training and proficiency in guerrilla warfare.”

Sources:
Dumiso Dabengwa, “The 1967 Wankie and 1968 Sipolilo Campaigns: The Impeccable ZAPU and ANC Alliance in Retrospect”, The Thinker, Vol. 80, 2019.
African National Congress, “Statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission”, August 1996.
Comrade Rodgers (Freddie Mninzi), “The Battle of Nyutuwe”, Dawn – Journal of Umkhonto we Sizwe, Souvenir Issue, December 1986.
Nicole (Nicky) Martina van Driel, “The ANC’s First Armed Military Operation: The Luthuli Detachment and the Wankie Campaign, July – September 1967”, MA Thesis, Univerrsity of the Western Cape, June 2003.
Joshua Chakawa and Vongai Z. Nyawo-Shava, “Guerrilla Warfare and the Environment in Southern Africa: Impediments Faced by ZIPRA and Umkhonto We Sizwe”, Oral History Journal of South Africa Vol. 2, No. 2, 2014.
Editorial, “ZAPU-ANC Fight On”, Supplement to Sechaba, Vol. 1, No. 10, October 1967.
Rendani Moses Ralinala, Jabulani Sithole, Gregory Houston and Bernard Magubane, “Chapter 12: The Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns”, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol. 1 (1960 – 1970), South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET), Zebra, 2004.
Thula Simpson, “Umkhonto we Sizwe: The ANC’s Armed Struggle”, Penguin, 2016.
Stephen R. Davis, “The ANC’s War against Apartheid: Umkhonto We Sizwe and the Liberation of South Africa”, Indiana University, 2018.

Castro Khwela
Good evening fellow Compatriots!