First Confrontation Between PLAN and the Apartheid Security Forces

First Confrontation Between PLAN and the Apartheid Security Forces

On 26 August 1966, the South West African Liberation Army (SWALA), the predecessor to the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), the armed wing of South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO), fought a serious battle against the apartheid South African occupying forces at Omugulugwombashe (aka Ongulumbashe), in northern Namibia.

It all began in September 1965, when SWALA established its first training camp on South West African soil, at Omugulugwombashe, to recruit and drill more guerrillas. During that time, SWALA numbered only about 250 personnel, most of whom were still undergoing training at Kongwa. The guerrillas at Omugulugwombashe, under the command of Johannes Nankudhu (aka “Johnny Otto”) succeeded in recruiting only about 30 locals before the location of their camp was reported to the apartheid South African Police (SAP).

Three policemen discreetly visited the site on 23 August 1966, and confirmed that the guerrillas were there. They then requested military assistance, and the apartheid South African Defence Force (SADF) was able to mobilise a section of paratroops to attack the camp. 130 paramilitary officers of the apartheid SAP’s Reaction Unit were also flown into the area for the raid. The attack commenced on 26 August 1966, with the apartheid forces abseiling into the camp from eight SADF Alouette III helicopters, which were on loan to the apartheid police.

The camp was destroyed and the SWALA suffered two casualties, with one being seriously wounded, and eight of the guerrillas being captured. The apartheid government subsequently arrested 37 of SWAPO’s most prominent leaders and tried them, along with the captured SWALA guerrillas, on charges of terrorism and armed insurrection. At least 20 of the detainees were given life sentences, while another 9 were given twenty year sentences. This was the first engagement between SWAPO forces and the apartheid security forces, which within SWAPO circles became known as the Namibian Heroes Day, which is still celebrated to this day in independent Namibia.

There were a variety of political factors behind SWAPO’s decision to take up arms against the apartheid government. The most important however was the Organisation of African Unity’s (OAU) Liberation Committee’s efforts of encouraging anti-colonial movements. The Committee collected approximately £20 000 in contributions from the OAU member states, which were promised to any South West African movement that would use them for the express purpose of armed struggle.

The then leading South West African National Union (SWANU) was denied the funds because it refused this condition. Consequently, all the money was given to SWAPO, as most of its members had studied in South Africa, where they had been influenced by the activities of the African National Congress (ANC), particularly the 1952 Defiance Campaign, and they had also decided to model their movement’s new military wing on that established by the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK).

In March 1962, Nujoma sent two recruiters, Lucas Pohamba and Elia Muatale, to Ovamboland, where SWAPO’s traditional political base was located, to recruit hundreds of volunteers for a new guerrilla army, which was subsequently named SWALA, with headquarters established in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The Tanzanian government permitted SWALA to set up a training camp at Kongwa, where the volunteers received guerrilla training, with the Soviet Union, Ghana, Egypt, Algeria, North Korea and the People’s Republic of China offering free military training programmes for SWALA recruits.

After 12 June 1968, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution which proclaimed South West Africa as “Namibia”, SWAPO decided to rename SWALA as the Namibian People’s Army (NPA). This was in accordance with the desires of the people of South West Africa for the country to be renamed “Namibia”. Thereafter, SWAPO started using the term “Namibia” more frequently in its political discourse, and SWALA began to be referred to as the Namibian People’s Army (NPA). Later on, in 1973, SWAPO decided to rename SWALA or NPA as the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN).

As the new military wing of the SWAPO, PLAN fought against the apartheid SADF) and the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF) during the Namibian War of Independence. Throughout its history, PLAN had both irregular insurgent and semi-conventional units, as well as an extensive recruitment network in rural South West Africa (Namibia). During the war most of its domestic activities consisted of guerrilla warfare, mine warfare and acts of sabotage. Once in Namibia combatants either planted landmines, sabotaged administration infrastructure, ambushed apartheid SADF and SWATF convoys, or attacked their bases from a stand-off distance by using mortars.

Initially, PLAN lacked any standing units, and most of its operations were undertaken by political exiles who spent cyclical periods residing in refugee camps in independent neighbouring states, particularly Angola, before launching raids inside South West Africa itself. The first incursions were staged from Zambia into the Caprivi strip by combatants in the early 1960s. PLAN incursions from Angola into Namibia restarted in earnest after the Portuguese withdrawal from Angola in 1975. Towards the end of the war, PLAN had more than 32,000 militants who were well-trained and armed, including three battalions of semi-conventional troops equipped with heavy weapons.

The largest and final offensive of PLAN was launched between late April and early March 1989, just after the defeat of the apartheid SADF in the eminent and momentous Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. Thereafter, it ceased operations due to the ongoing peace process in South West Africa and withdrew to above the 16th parallel south. PLAN’s main forces were then disarmed and demobilised on its Angolan camps in late 1989 by the United Nations (UN) Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) and repatriated to South West Africa. A small number remained in reserve until after Namibian independence, when they were also repatriated into the newly independent Namibia. The last PLAN forces and equipment were returned to Namibia in mid-1990 for integration into the new Namibian Defence Force (NDF).

Following clear indications that independence was imminent, the Editorial of the official organ of the ANC, Sechaba, commented that, “The task facing us and Africa as a whole is to fight to complete the anti-colonial revolution on the continent; a process which is basically anti-racist. This is definitely in the interests of the Namibian people. There is more to it. If South Africa is not liberated a Damocles sword will hang over their heads. They will continue to be exploited in the South African mines and economy – an economy they helped to develop. By liberating Namibia, these people have brought the day of our liberation nearer, and we are duty bound to help them secure their independence by overthrowing the apartheid regime.”

The Editorial continued to say, “The ANC has pledged to do everything in its power to facilitate Namibian independence. The ANC in its wisdom decided, as President Tambo says in the January 8th Statement, in consultation with the fraternal Government of the People’s Republic of Angola and other friendly African countries, to help in this process by agreeing to move its military personnel from Angola ‘so as not to allow the racists and their allies to use the presence of ANC military facilities in Angola as an excuse for blocking or otherwise delaying the process now in motion’. This is political maturity, revolutionary solidarity and internationalism in action. We know we are dealing with a wounded beast and as usual a wounded beast is the most dangerous animal in the jungle. Let us deal with this wounded beast!”

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Castro Khwela
Good day fellow Compatriots!