Inkinga wena kaNdaba iseSandlwana

Inkinga wena kaNdaba iseSandlwana

(The Complication, Son of Ndaba – referring to Cetshwayo – Is What Happened at Isandlwana)

“… the Zulus … did what no European army can do. Armed only with lances and spears, without any firearms, they advanced under a hail of bullets from breech-loaders up to the bayonets of the English infantry – the best in the world for fighting in closed ranks – and threw them into confusion more than once, yea, even forced them to retreat in spite of the immense disparity of weapons …”

– Friedrich Engels: The Origin of the Family –

“Friederich Engels was marvelling at the victory of the Zulu impis of iNgonyama uCetshwayo over the British Imperial Army at Isandlwana Hill on 22 January 1879” (Sibeko). Eleven days after the British commenced their invasion of Zululand in Southern Africa, the Battle of Isandlwana became the first major encounter in the Anglo-Zulu War between the British Empire and the Zulu Kingdom. A Zulu force of some 20,000 warriors annihilated a portion of the British main column consisting of about 1,800 British, colonial and native troops and perhaps 400 civilians.

“At that historic battle the entire central column of a British invasion army – the most modern and well-equipped that the world’s leading power could put into the field – was skilfully outmanoeuvred and wiped out by African warriors. Nine hundred British troop were speared to death as well as a similar number of African Native levies under British officers” (Sibeko).

Following the scheme by which Lord Carnarvon had brought about the “Confederation of Canada” through the 1867 British North America Act, it was thought that a similar plan might succeed in South Africa. Accordingly, in 1877 Sir Henry Bartle Frere was appointed as High Commissioner for Southern Africa to instigate the scheme. One of the obstacles to such a plan was primarily the Kingdom of the Zulu, which the British Empire would attempt to overcome by force of arms.

Bartle Frere, on his own initiative, without the approval of the British government and with the intent of instigating a war with the Zulu, had presented a provocative ultimatum to the Zulu King Cetshwayo on 11 December 1878 with which the Zulu King could not possibly comply. When the ultimatum expired a month later, Frere ordered Lord Chelmsford to proceed with an invasion of Zululand, for which plans had already been made.

Chelmsford, the Commander-in-Chief of British forces during the war, initially planned a five-pronged invasion of Zululand consisting of over 16,500 troops in five columns and designed to encircle the Zulu army and force it to fight as he was concerned that the Zulus would avoid battle, slip around the British and over the Tugela, and strike at Natal. Instead, Cetshwayo sent the 24,000 strong main Zulu impi from near present-day Ulundi, on 17 January, across the White Umfolozi River, with the following command to his warriors: “March slowly, attack at dawn and eat up the red ears (IsiZulu – ondlebezikhanyilanga)!”

On 21 January they moved into the Ngwebeni Valley, where they remained concealed, planning to attack the British on 23 January. However, they were discovered by a British scouting party on 22 January. Under the command of General Ntshigwayo kaMahole kaKhoza, the Zulu army had reached its position in easy stages, as the speed of the Zulu advance was marked, as compared to that of the British. The Zulu impi had advanced over 80 km in five days, while Chelmsford had only advanced slightly over 16 km in 10 days.

The British under Chelmsford pitched camp at Isandlwana on 20 January, but did not follow standing orders to entrench. There was thus no fortification undertaken, no circling of the wagons was formed, as Chelmsford did not see the need for one. Therefore, the chief reason for the failure to take defensive precautions appears to have been that the British command severely underestimated the Zulus’ capabilities.

The Zulu forces were equipped mainly with the traditional assegai iron spears and cowhide shields, but also had a number of muskets and antiquated rifles. The British and colonial troops were armed with the modern Martini-Henry breechloading rifles and two 7-pounder mountain guns deployed as field guns, as well as a Hale rocket battery.

Despite a vast disadvantage in weapons technology, the Zulus ultimately overwhelmed the British force, killing over 1,300 troops, including all those out on the forward firing line. The Zulu army suffered around 1,000 men killed. The battle was a decisive victory for the valiant Zulus and caused the defeat of the first British invasion of Zululand. The Imperialist British Army had suffered its worst defeat against an indigenous foe equipped with vastly inferior military technology.

The battle – as the heyday of British Empire and colonial might – is regarded as one of the most humiliating defeats in the annals of Britain’s military history, “the greatest disaster since the Crimean War”. News of iNgonyama uCetshwayo’s unexpected and overwhelming victory stunned Victorian England and sent shockwaves throughout colonial South Africa. The arrogant British Commander, Lord Chelmsford, retreated to Durban in consternation and disgrace. There he waited for thousands of troop reinforcements which were soon to pour in from all corners of the Empire.

For the time being the predatory colonial war ground to a dead halt, although there could be no doubt about its ultimate, tragic outcome. The Zulus had won a signal battle, but for them, as for all the brave indigenous people of our country, there could be no question of winning the war. The British imperialists liked to boast that their’s was an Empire “on which the sun never set”; it was in fact an Empire “on which the blood never ran dry”.

Isandlwana could be no more than a pyrrhic victory. There was no gloating among the Zulu. When reports of the battle reached him, iNgonyama uCetshwayo remarked: “An assegai has been thrust into the belly of the nation. There are not enough tears to mourn for the dead.”

What are the lessons to be learnt from the Battle of Isandlwana? Alexander Sibeko maintained that there were two essential points which had to be grasped, not simply from the victory of Isandlwana (which could not be viewed in isolation) but from that whole glorious era of military resistance. They were both of essential importance for the liberation and defence of our country, South Africa.

Firstly: there exists an indomitable fighting spirit among all our people, which has as its basis the resistance to the wars of dispossession. This spirit resides deep in the psychological make-up of our people and cannot be denied. What better quote than Nelson Mandela’s statement from the dock in Pretoria? “In my youth in the Transkei”, Mandela declared, “I listened to the elders of my tribe telling stories of the old day … I hoped and vowed then that, among the treasures that life might offer me, would be the opportunity to serve my people, and make my own humble contribution to the freedom struggles” (Sibeko).

Secondly: the unity of our people, which was not possible a hundred years ago, is of paramount importance today. In citing the struggles of the past, we stress the common heritage, the common enemy, the common struggle. … The burning lesson of our history is that the struggle of our people must be united, with a single common goal which it is treason to lose sight of: PEOPLE’S POWER OVER EVERY INCH OF AN INDIVISIBLE SOUTH AFRICA.

Whilst finding inspiration in the deeds and traditions of the resistance – Khoi, San, Xhosa, Pedi, Sotho, Tswana, Zulu, Pondo, Ndebele, Griqua, Venda, Shangaan – we must build the unshakeable unity of all. We must deepen the unifying national consciousness of all our people which is a prerequisite for … A NATION-WIDE VICTORY IN THE STRUGGLE TO FASHION A SOCIETY ALONG THE LINES OF OUR FREEDOM CHARTER.

The courage of our ancestors survives. The spirit of the oppressed is resilient. Autocratic regimes are vulnerable. We are living in an age where history is on our side. Accordingly, the 1979 Umkhonto we Sizwe’s (MK) “Isandlwana Detachment” was named after 100 years of the Battle of Isandlwana – when the Zulu regiments defeated the British forces in 1879.

Sources:
Wikipedia.
South African History Online (SAHO).
Alexander Sibeko, “An Epic of African Resistance”, The African Communist, No. 76, First Quarter, 1979.
Sechaba Analyst, “The Great Battle: The Story of African Resistance in 1879”, Sechaba, February Issue, 1979.

Castro Khwela
Good day fellow Compatriots!