Simonstown Naval Agreement Momentarily Revitalised

Simonstown Naval Agreement Momentarily Revitalised

On 27 January 1961, the Chief of the apartheid South African Defence Force (SADF), Commandant General Rudolph Hiemstra, announced the successful conclusion of British-South African talks on aspects of the Simonstown Naval Agreement for the defence of sea routes around Southern Africa. The Simonstown Agreement dated back to 30 June 1955, when it was signed by apartheid South Africa and Great Britain. In terms of this agreement, the South African Navy was expanded and the Simonstown base and Naval Dockyard were handed over to South Africa on 1 April 1957.

The agreement also permitted the SA Navy to buy six new Type 12 (modified Rothesay Class) anti-submarine frigates, ten Ton Class coastal minesweepers and five Ford Class seaward defence boats from the United Kingdom (UK) of Great Britain valued at £18 million over the following eight years. Accordingly, the Simonstown Agreement initiated an era of unprecedented expansion and modernisation of the South African Navy between 1955 and 1963, resulting in the development of a small but highly professional, efficient and well-equipped naval force.

Under the agreement, the UK Royal Navy (RN) gave up its naval base at Simonstown and transferred command of the South African Navy (SAN) to the apartheid government. In return, South Africa promised the use of the Simonstown base to Royal Navy ships. In effect, the agreement was a mutual geostrategic defence arrangement aimed at protecting sea routes between the UK and the Middle East.

In the planning stages, the agreement was intended to include: the combined use of Simon’s Town by the Royal Navy and South African Navy in peace and in war, even if South Africa were neutral in some non-Communist war, on the understanding that the base would also be available in war to the allies of the United Kingdom; the gradual assumption of responsibility by the South African Navy for the operation and administration of the base for combined use; the assumption by South Africa of responsibility in war for the operational and administrative control of a local sub-area of a South Atlantic Strategic Zone; and that a Royal Navy officer would continue as Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic in peace, with headquarters and communications at the Cape, and that his designation in war would be Commander of the South Atlantic Strategic Zone.

From a financial perspective, while Britain retained full access to Simonstown, the agreement imposed considerable obligations on the South Africans and absolved Britain from the costly upkeep and modernisation of the base and other maritime facilities at the Cape, including access to strategic naval communications and fuel stocks.

Finally, from an economic perspective, the Agreement greatly benefited the British industry with significant South African orders for warships, helicopters and maritime patrol and strike aircraft. However, the agreement became controversial because of South Africa’s policy of apartheid.

After coming to power in the 1948 general election, the Nationalist Party regime under Prime Minister Daniël François Malan, pressed with growing urgency for the Royal Naval Base at Simon’s Town to be transferred to South African control. The motives behind the apartheid regime’s initiative were essentially political and arose from the traditional attitude of the Nationalist Party towards the United Kingdom’s use of the base in war. The Nationalist Party regime was concerned about South Africa’s responsibility for its land defences, that it would make it impossible for South Africa to remain neutral in such a war and that the South African government and parliament were consequently deprived of the sovereign right to decide freely the supreme question of peace or war for their own country.

In the early 1960s, as the Nationalist Party’s racial policies began to create increasing ill-will abroad, as apartheid South Africa was subjected to a process of increasing isolation from the international community. Despite South Africa’s departure from the Commonwealth in 1961 and increasing international pressure, the British government continued to maintain defence links with the apartheid regime. In words the Conservative Party ministers professed to abhor apartheid-but when it came to action, they always had a ready excuse not to support any proposal at the United Nations which meant bringing real pressure to bear on the Hendrik Verwoerd regime.

Britain continued to supply arms to South Africa in terms of the Simonstown Agreement, and the 1955 exchanges were re-affirmed in a further informal exchange of letters between the British and South African Defence Ministers in 1961 – 1962. A subsidiary of the Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) was helping to construct three arms factories in South Africa. Ultimately, following the election of a Labour government, led by Harold Wilson, in the United Kingdom in October 1964, Britain refused to supply further arms to South Africa. Yet within months of being returned to office, the Labour Government turned its back on its own conference resolution and authorised the holding of joint manoeuvres with the South African navy on a scale bigger than anything seen since the Second World War. The world-wide disgusted reaction to this betrayal by the Labour government forced Wilson to back-track somewhat and to reverse any commitments on the Simonstown Agreement.

Whilst this ban included any new orders for maritime aircraft and naval vessels and equipment, the British government was still prepared to honour existing contracts and to provide spares and ammunition within the terms of the Agreement. This concession was later extended to include licences for the sale of additional Wasp helicopters in 1966 to replace aircraft written off during normal operations. At that stage, all South African naval vessels were of British design and construction.

For reasons of compatibility and logistics, and because of the close traditional links with the Royal Navy, South Africa wished to place orders for submarines and replacements for the Loch class and Type 15 frigates in the United Kingdom. However, the Labour government was not prepared to approve the construction of any additional vessels for the South African Navy.

As a result, apartheid South Africa, which would have preferred to acquire Oberon class submarines from the United Kingdom, turned to France for the provision of three Daphne class submarines. France continued to sell some weapons to the racist regime, but pressure was mounting for most countries to comply with the voluntary United Nations 1963 Arms Embargo, which became mandatory in 1977. This led to desperation within the apartheid defence establishment, which turned to Israel, as the only country that was willing to help in selling anything and everything to Pretoria.

The South African-Indian Ocean-Middle East Axis played a vital part in the growing alliance between the apartheid regime and world imperialism, an alliance which, while strengthening the apartheid regime also enabled the policies of that regime to influence imperialist aggressive designs in the southern African region. It dovetailed well with the military theory and “defence” philosophy of the apartheid South African militarists whose function was to prevent or suppress so-called “internal disorder”, that was, the liberation movement of South Africa; to strike at the source of the problem in the Frontline states so as “to counter the menace” of warfare and to control the sea-lanes in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans in the interests of world imperialism.

The progressive states in Africa, together with the liberation movements, had a great responsibility and were called upon to play their role in the struggle for the demilitarisation of the Indian and Atlantic Oceans as an aspect of the general anti-imperialist struggle. What this meant was the eradication of all foreign military bases on the continent and in the two oceans because they became a threat to the sovereignty, security and independence of the African continent and served as a support for neo-colonialist efforts in Africa.

Sources:
Wikipedia.
South African History Online (SAHO).
John Gollan, “Britain and South Africa”, The African Communist, Vol. 2 No. 4, July-September, 1963.
Editorial, “The Simonstown Agreement”, Sechaba, Vol. 4, No. 10, October 1970.
Editorial Notes, “South Africa Under Siege”, The African Communist, No.60, First Quarter, 1975.
F. Meli, “S. Africa Joins Imperialist Bloc in Indian Ocean Offensive”, The African Communist, No.61, Second Quarter, 1975.
Allan du Toit, “The Anglo-South African Simon’s Town Agreement”, The Commonwealth Navies: 100 Years of Cooperation, Sea Power Centre Australia, Canberra, 2012.

Castro Khwela
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