The Beginnings of the Anglo-Zulu War: 11 January 1879
On 11 January 1879, when General Chelmsford’s ultimatum to the Zulu Ingonyama uCetshwayo kaMpande to disband the regiments and lay down arms had been ignored, a British Army of approximately 18 000 troops, cavalry and hundreds of wagon trains loaded with food, weapons and equipment, crossed the Tugela River and invaded Zululand. As the Commander-in-Chief of British forces during the war, General Chelmsford initially planned a five-pronged invasion of Zululand composed of over 16,500 troops in five columns and designed to encircle the Zulu army and force it to fight as he was concerned that the Zulus would avoid battle. The centre of gravity was Zulu capital, Ulundi, which was about 120 kilometres inside Zulu territory.
“So confident was Chelmsford that his adversary would soon be crushed that he contemptuously dismissed all talk of their military skill, efficient intelligence system and excellent use of the terrain. The Boers, who had learnt from their own bitter experience, warned that a Zulu army moved with terrific speed and claimed that the actual charge of an impi was as swift as cavalry” (Alexander Sibeko, The African Communist).
The invasion was part of the grand design of bringing the whole of Southern Africa under British imperialism’s political and economic control, which depended on smashing conclusively both the military power and the agrarian self-sufficiency of the Zulu people. This greedy plan was succinctly expressed by the master of treachery and deceit Theophilus Shepstone who, as secretary for native affairs in Natal, reported regretfully after attending Ingonyama Cetshwayo’s coronation in 1872 that the Zulus “were so attached to their regimental system” that the “recruitment of labour from that people” was impossible.
For years Shepstone had sided with the Zulus in their bitter territorial dispute with the Transvaal Boers over the Buffalo and Pongola River lands. This time he treacherously switched sides when he became the administrator of the Transvaal, as Britain anticipated a pact with the Boers, and began to provoke the atmosphere for a so-called “civilising war” against Cetshwayo. In his report he depicted the Zulus as a barbaric and unruly race, unfit to govern their country and a constant menace to the ‘white civilisation’ of Natal.
Accordingly, the die was soon cast and the bloody process launched which would in time transform Cetshwayo’s warriors into landless labourers working for wages. Henry Bartle Edward Frere, the British High Commissioner for Southern Africa, argued to the Colonial Office that if the British Confederation of Southern African states was to succeed, Cetshwayo’s forces had to be eliminated and Zululand annexed, which implied that the Zulu Kingdom under King Cetshwayo could not remain independent of British control.
Frere succeeded in provoking a conflict with the Zulus when Cetshwayo rejected the demands of 11 December 1878, by not responding by the end of the year. He granted a concession to Cetshwayo until 11 January 1879, after which he deemed a state of war to exist. The British forces intended for the defense of Natal had already been on the march with the intention to attack the Zulu kingdom. On 10 January they were poised on the border and on 11 January, they crossed the border and invaded Zululand.
To the Zulu people, the decision to make war came as a surprise, since disputes and conflicts had mainly been with the Boers and relations with the British were often tactful and diplomatic. With the decision to launch a violent and sudden war on the Zulu kingdom, Shepstone had totally betrayed Cetshwayo’s trust. Understandably, the British knew that Cetshwayo could not have complied with the order to disband his army and to abandon his military system within 30 days. Even if Cetshwayo wanted to bow down to the British ultimatum, he would have been deposed immediately by a more determined successor.
Sources:
Wikipedia.
South African History Online (SAHO).
Alexander Sibeko, “An Epic of African Resistance”, The African Communist, No. 76, First Quarter 1979.
Sechaba, “The Great Battle: The Story of African Resistance in 1879”, Sechaba, February Issue, 1979.
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