Mikhail Gorbachev Resigns Towards Dissolution of the CPSU

Mikhail Gorbachev Resigns Towards Dissolution of the CPSU

“If there is one lesson we can derive from all this it is that the organised socialist movement in this country can only be achieved on a genuinely democratic basis.” – Mkhulu

On 24 August 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and called on the Central Committee to dissolve. The resignation and dissolution of the Central Committee led to the disbandment of the CPSU on 30 August 1991, after all Communist Party activity was indefinitely suspended by the Supreme Soviet, effectively ending communist rule in the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev’s resignation followed a number of dramatic events that began in February 1990, when both the liberal reformers and Marxist–Leninist hardliners intensified their attacks on his leadership. A liberal reformers’ march took place in Moscow criticising Communist Party rule, while at a Central Committee meeting, the hardliner Vladimir Brovikov accused Gorbachev of reducing the country to “anarchy” and “ruin” and of pursuing Western approval at the expense of the Soviet Union and the Marxist–Leninist cause.

This attack was primarily with regard to Gorbachev’s “glasnost” and “perestroika” policies: his policy of “glasnost” (openness) allowed for enhanced freedom of speech and the press, while his “perestroika” (restructuring) sought to decentralise economic decision-making to improve its efficiency. Gorbachev’s democratisation measures were perceived to have undermined the Soviet socialist one-party state.

Being aware that the Central Committee could still oust him as General Secretary, Gorbachev decided to reformulate the role of head of government to a presidency from which he could not be removed. He decided that the presidential election should be held by the Congress of People’s Deputies and chose this over a public vote because he thought that such a vote would escalate tensions and feared that he might lose it.

With the Soviet budget deficit climbing and no domestic money markets to provide the state with loans, Gorbachev requested sizable loans from Western countries and Japan, hoping to keep the Soviet economy afloat and ensure the success of perestroika.

Seeking compromise with the liberal reformers, Gorbachev assembled a team of his own and Boris Yeltsin’s advisers to come up with an economic reform package: the result was the “500 Days” programme. This called for further decentralisation and some privatisation, which Gorbachev described as “modern socialism” rather than a return to capitalism, but had many doubts about it.

Many in the CPSU and state apparatus warned against it, arguing that it would create marketplace chaos, rampant inflation, and unprecedented levels of unemployment. Ultimately, the 500 Days plan was abandoned. By mid-November 1990, much of the press was calling for Gorbachev to resign and predicting civil war. Hardliners were urging Gorbachev to disband the presidential council and arrest vocal liberals in the media. By this point, Gorbachev was isolated from many of his former close allies and aides.

In August, while Gorbachev and his family were on holiday at their dacha, “Zarya” (Dawn) in Foros, Crimea, a group of senior Communist Party figures – the “Gang of Eight” – calling themselves the State Committee of the State of Emergency (SCSE) launched a coup d’état to seize control of the Soviet Union. The coup plotters publicly announced that Gorbachev was ill and thus Vice President Yanayev would take charge of the country.

Boris Yeltsin, who was at the time the President of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, went inside the Moscow White House. Tens of thousands of protesters massed outside it to prevent troops storming the building to arrest him. Outside of the White House, Yeltsin, atop a tank, gave a memorable speech condemning the coup. On 21 August, after realising that they lacked sufficient support, the coup’s leaders ended their efforts and arrived at Gorbachev’s dacha to inform him that they were doing so.

That evening, Gorbachev returned to Moscow, where he thanked Yeltsin and the protesters for helping to undermine the coup. At a subsequent press conference, he pledged to reform the Soviet Communist Party, but two days later, he resigned as its general secretary and called on the Central Committee to dissolve. Several members of the coup committed suicide; others were fired.

What went wrong?

According to “Mkhulu” (an old friend of the South African Communist Party and the African National Congress in Moscow), there was a strong temptation to put all the blame for the CPSU tragedy on “Gorbachev’s betrayal”. Many party members in private discussions and in public statements did not bother to search for polite words in order to describe Gorbachev’s behaviour. But such an approach is an over-simplification. The causes are more profound than the behaviour (or misbehaviour) of one person.

We should mention, first of all, the gap between grassroots party organisation and the leadership, In the years of perestroika many sweet words were said about inner-party democracy, about the rule of the masses. ln practice, the gap between leadership and the base hardly diminished. The first meeting between the General Secretary and the working class and peasant members of the Central Committee took place a full year after their election. A similar attitude was expressed towards party full-timers. In his six years in office Gorbachev never once found the time to meet the staff of the Central Committee.

A second factor was an overwhelming desire to keep the party united at any cost. Both extreme conservatives like Nina Andreeva and obvious opportunists like Alexander Yakovlev and Eduard Shevardnadze were tolerated as comrades for too long.

A very strong negative effect on party activities and on the Party’s authority also resulted from the gradual weakening of its collective leadership, especially after Gorbachev became the head of state. Both the Politbureau, whose sessions were convened less and less regularly, and the Secretariat, increasingly lost all real say in decision-making processes on the most crucial issues of internal and external policy. For example, the decision to raise prices sharply – three or four times on many goods – was taken in April 1991 by the government, without any consultation with Central Committee members. But the people at large put the blame for their hardships on the CPSU, which they still regarded as a ruling party.

The April events caught the CPSU in the midst of the difficult and painful transformation to real independence from being a Party entwined with state structures. At the same time the Party was becoming more and more hostage to one man, until this man sacrificed it in order to ensure his own survival for a few more weeks as Soviet President.

If there is one lesson we can derive from all this it is that the organised socialist movement in this country can only be achieved on a genuinely democratic basis.

While most communist parties globally concurred with Gorbachev’s assessment that the CPSU needed internal reform, they did not agree on how it was implemented, criticising his idea of “perestroika” and “glasnost”, of negating the leading role of the CPSU, of negating Marxism, of negating the analysis of class contradictions and class struggle, and of negating the “ultimate socialist goal of realising communism”.

The African National Congress (ANC) had a close relationship with the Soviet Union under the CPSU, which was staunchly opposed to the apartheid government, as well as colonialism in Africa and the developing world in general. In 1961, the South African Communist Party (SACP) leaders visited Moscow to outline the party’s plans to launch an armed struggle and secured the support of the CPSU. Between 1963 and 1990, the Soviet Union provided the ANC with various types of assistance, including financial support, academic development, military training and equipment, logistical supplies, as well as technical assistance and training.

It was really sad to witness the dissolution of the CPSU and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Sources:
Wikipedia.
South African History Online (SAHO).
Mkhulu, “Moscow Tragedy: “Mkhulu” an old friend of the SACP and ANC in Moscow gives a view from the inside of the days after the failed August Coup”, The African Communist, No. 128 First Quarter 1992

Castro Khwela
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