Operation Vula: The Post-Mortem

Operation Vula: The Post-Mortem

On Tuesday, 21 August 1990, Colonel Johannes Steyn and Lieutenant Colonel Hendrik J.P. ‘Hentie’ Botha, of the Natal Security Branch intelligence unit, reported to the apartheid Police Commissioner, General Johan van der Merwe, on the episode around the killing of two African National Congress (ANC) and Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) operatives, Charles Ndaba and Mbuso Shabalala. Charles Ndaba was arrested at KwaMashu Township, near Durban, on 6 July 1990, and led the Security Branch to a place next to the Greyville Racecourse in Durban, where Shabalala was arrested. Both were killed on 14 July 1990 after refusing to turn on the ANC.

According to Lieutenant Colonel ‘Hentie’ Botha, he had recruited Ndaba as an informer in 1988. Ndaba then returned and became part of Operation Vula in 1990. Botha thus knew of the Operation to the extent that Ndaba did, but Ndaba and Shabalala were eventually killed by members of the Durban Security Branch after Ndaba signalled his intention to “take his chances with the ANC”. After they were killed by members of the Security Branch, which included Major du Preez, Warrant Officer Wasserman and Sergeant van der Westhuizen, their bodies were weighed down and dumped into the Tugela River. Johannes Steyn, Salmon du Preez, Lawrence Wasserman and Casper van der Westhuizen applied for amnesty for their involvement in the murders.

Later on, in 2017, one of the Vula operatives, Dipak Patel, confirmed that “Round about July 10 (actually July 14)‚ 1990‚ my two closest comrades‚ Mbuso Tshabalala and Charles Ndaba (we served on Vula’s MCW Committee together) were executed in cold blood … After being tortured to the edge of their lives in Section 29 detention‚ they were taken to the mouth of the Tugela‚ made to kneel and then shot in the back of their heads. Their bodies were wrapped in wire mesh‚ weighed down with rocks and thrown into the river — never to be found or recovered. This is my Durban.”

The Security Branch was at that time desperate to uncover the moles within their ranks that were informing the Vula operatives about what the Security Branch was intending to do. These moles, with the codenames of the “Owl” and the “Nightingale” were discovered after the analysis of data that was captured in the computer system that was found at at No. 48, the Knoll, in Durban’s Kenville suburb, where they arrested Raymond Lalla, Siphiwe Nyanda and other Vula operatives.

The arrested operatives were unsuccessfully interrogated to reveal the names of these moles. However, someone senior in Operation Vula knew the real identities of the “Owl” and the “Nightingale”. Actually the mole “Nightingale” was a “walk-in” that was handled by Moe Shaik, as part of Operation Bible, whereas the “Owl” was recruited and handled by one of the Vula operatives. However, when Moe Shaik got involved with Operation Vula, they were able to verify information provided by these two against each other.

The intention by Botha was to use Ndaba and Shabalala to reveal these moles. Ndaba was personally chosen by MK commander Siphiwe Nyanda to become part of the Vula operation structure. In his evidence-in-chief, Botha said Ndaba had become “uncertain of his future” and it was recommended that he underwent plastic surgery as his informer status had been compromised. Botha said, “However, when Ndaba threatened to tell the ANC about Shabalala’s abduction and his own status as an apartheid informer … That’s when I decided he should be eliminated along with Shabalala who could be released or charged lawfully anyway”, Botha said.

A witch-hunt, according to Botha, was conducted by the ANC in the 1980s to purge itself of moles planted or recruited by the Security Branch, which made the Branch’s efforts to recruit ANC informers easier. Botha further maintained that successes by the Port Natal Security Branch in intercepting MK members entering the country had prompted the witch-hunt.

For Botha “There was a fear psychosis among ANC members and as a result of that, when I approached Ndaba he had two choices: firstly to go and tell of my approach and run the risk of being suspected of being an informer or secondly to keep quiet and play along. Ndaba chose to keep quiet and then led the Security Branch to Shabalala and gave the addresses of the Vula operation’s safe houses in Durban, thus compromising the entire operation.”

“Vula”, Jeremy Gordin maintained, “which really only got going in mid-1988, did not manage to organise a “people’s war”. By then the people’s war was, in any case, more in the hands of the internal mass democratic movement than the ANC. But Vula did succeed in setting up an excellent and vital communications conduit from inside South Africa to ANC headquarters, a channel which included Nelson Mandela in Pollsmoor Prison. Vula’s operatives also successfully brought a great deal of arms and war materiel into South Africa.”

Nine trialists were brought to (the apartheid) court on 29 October 1990. “All of them”, according to Dipak Patel, “were proud‚ committed‚ revolutionary cadres of the ANC‚ both from its political and its military underground. These men and women represented the qualities of an ANC and SACP cadre of that time. Each of them went through the fire – political education‚ taught in ‘The Constructive Method’‚ and mentored in the ways of being a disciplined‚ thoughtful‚ militant and selfless revolutionaries. Two of these cadres had already previously served long term prison sentences on Robben Island‚ and some had already spent multiple periods in security detention.”

Dipak Patel maintained that Operation Vula was “a unity of young and old (youngest being Anesh‚ who was 21 years old, and the eldest being Billy‚ who was around 67), men and women‚ with no regard to race or ethnicity. Just a deep commitment to a better future for our country‚ for all our people. … The Operation Vula triailists were granted indemnity in 1991. They‚ together with hundreds of other ANC comrades‚ dedicated themselves to working towards a non-racial‚ non-sexist and democratic South Africa. A South Africa that would see an end to apartheid and that would usher in a future in which all citizens would get a chance to improve their lives.”

In a press statement by ANC Deputy President, Nelson Mandela, on the Operation Vulindlela and the indemnification of ANC members on 22 June 1991, he said, “We welcome the indemnification of comrades who have been associated with Operation Vulindlela and who successfully evaded all attempts by the security services to capture them … All these and many other comrades associated with Vulindlela and the underground in general were acting on the instructions of the ANC.”

Mandela maintained that “They displayed exemplary qualities by refusing to be panicked by the detentions and relentless search by the security forces. They kept cool heads, maintained their discipline, and stayed at their posts … Operation Vulindlela was one of the numerous missions undertaken by our movement. In its planning and execution, it brought together the experience we had gathered in almost three decades of clandestine struggle. It was special because it was conceived at a special moment in our struggle. The revolt of our people had plunged the apartheid state into a permanent crisis.”

“Vulindlela”, Mandela continued, “was a part of a series of missions, carefully planned and with the fullest regard for the immense risk involved. It was not a knee-jerk reaction, nor was it a quick-fix solution. It was conceived and planned for in terms of the long-term strategy for the movement. It did not supplant other operations – it reinforced them. It is a tribute to the leadership qualities of our President, O R Tambo, that he and his team planned and set about executing Vulindlela in such a way that for more than two years the government and its security forces had no inkling of its existence; had not detected that members of the leadership were living and working inside the country.”

“This mission”, Mandela emphasised, “had its origins in a 1986 resolution of the NEC of the ANC, which authorised our President, together with Comrade Joe Slovo, to undertake the task of relocating senior members of the movement – including members of the NEC – in the country to create on-the-spot integrated political-military structures charges with the task of giving day-to-day leadership to the struggle and enhancing the work of the NEC. This is not the occasion to present a detailed appraisal of Operation Vulindlela. What can be placed on record is that the mission found conditions inside the country such, that with amazing speed, the movement was able to root leading cadres in region after region. Throughout, the response was such that the leadership could begin to plan and transfer numerous leading members into the country on an indefinite basis.”

According to Mandela, “The movement had developed its techniques to such an extent that, for example, in the case of communications, our President was in a position to receive detailed reports about progress and the situation in the country on a daily basis and in turn provide guidance to the mission. In varying degrees this same sophistication began to manifest itself in all areas of work, including the bringing of personnel and weapons into the country.”

In conclusion, Mandela said, “It is common knowledge between the government and ourselves that the majority of these personnel and the bulk of this material did not fall into the hands of the security forces despite the arrests. On behalf of the African National Congress and its allies, let me clarify one further point. Vula and other similar projects did not in any way constitute the pursuance of a double agenda, nor did they constitute actions inconsistent with our search for a negotiated resolution. Anything, they strengthened negotiations rather than undermined them.”

Sources:
Wikipedia.
South African History Online (SAHO).
Jeremy Gordin, “The Zuma Alumni”, Politicsweb, 12 June 2009.
Dipak Patel, “Ex ANC Operative Vows to Mobilise Against Zuma Ahead of No Confidence Vote”, SowetanLIVE, 12 April 2017.
SAPA, “Man Killed for Exposing Security Branch”, South African Press Association, 19 August 1999.
Nelson Mandela, “Press Statement of ANC Deputy President, Nelson Mandela, on the Operation Vulindlela and the Indemnification of ANC Members”, African National Congress, 22 June 1991.
Paddy Harper, “Real Life Spy Drama Reads Like a Novel”, The Mail & Guardian, 28 February 2020.
African National Congress, “Further Submissions and Responses by the African National Congress to Questions Raised by the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation”, 12 May 1997.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 2”, 29 October 1998.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 3”, 29 October 1998.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 6”, 21 March 2003.
Adil Bradow, “Events Around the Release of Political Prisoners Operation Vula and the Pretoria Minute”, Oryx Archives, 6 August 1990.
Botha W. Kruger, “Prenegotiation in South Africa (1985 – 1993): A Phaseological Analysis of the Transitional Negotiations”, Master of Arts, University of Stellenbosch, March 1998.
Barry Van Wyk, “The Balance of Power and the Transition to Democracy in South Africa”, Master of Heredity and Cultural Sciences, University of Pretoria, 2005.
Zwelethu Jolobe, “Getting to CODESA: An Analysis on Why Multiparty Negotiations in South Africa Began, 1984-1991”, Doctor of Philosophy, University of Cape Town, May 2014.
Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk, “Transitional Politics in South Africa: From Confrontation to Democracy”, The South African Institute of International Affairs, November 1992.
Tim Jenkin, “The Story of the Secret Underground Communications Network of Operation Vula”, in Padraig O’Malley, “The Heart of Hope – South Africa’s Transition from Apartheid to Democracy”, Nelson Mandela Foundation, 30 November 2004.
Thula Simpson, “Umkhonto we Sizwe: The ANC’s Armed Struggle”, Penguin, 2016.
Stephen Ellis, “External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960 – 1990”, Oxford University, 2013.
Matthew Graham, “Foreign Policy in Transition: The ANC’s Search for a Foreign Policy Direction during South Africa’s Transition, 1990–1994”, The Round Table, Vol. 101, No. 5, 2012.
Janet Smith and Beauregard Tromp, “Hani: A Life Too Short”, Jonathan Ball, 2009.
Nelson Mandela, “Long Walk to Freedom”, Abacus, 1994.
Stephen Davis, “The ANC’s War against Apartheid: Umkhonto we Sizwe and the Liberation of South Africa”, Indiana University, 2018.

Castro Khwela
Good evening fellow Compatriots!