Apartheid Enemy Agents: The Shishita Report and Challenges of Fazenda

Apartheid Enemy Agents: The Shishita Report and Challenges of Fazenda

On 17 March 1981, a team from the African National Congress’s (ANC) Department of National Intelligence and Security (NAT) Security Sector visited Mac Maharaj in Lusaka, Zambia. One of them informed Maharaj that they found tapes in Piper’s possession, and they asked if Maharaj could verify if they were authentic. Maharaj listened to the tapes and said it was his voice when he was delivering talks and lectures for five graduates from the Lenin School. Piper was part of the course, and it was inferred that he was secretly recording the lectures to hand them over to the apartheid South African Security Police.

Piper, who was also known as “Elliot Mazibuko”, real name Pule Moses Malebane, was a member of the 1976 intake, the renowned June 16 Detachment, an Instructor and Political Commissar of Company 4 of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) at the “University of the South”, Novo Catengue, in Angola’s Benguela province. In 1978, he was one of a group of six sent for two years to the prestigious Lenin School in Moscow, and this was a group being prepared by Mac Maharaj for deployment inside the country and in the forward areas.

On 14 March 1981, the National Working Committee (NWC) of the ANC also received a report on security breaches, which included a reference to the return of Oshkosh and Bhekimpi, including other agents and suspects, to Lusaka, Zambia. It was actually the Zambian Police which indicated that they wanted to interview Oshkosh (MK name of Mompati Godfrey Bosigo Khumalo), the liaison officer at Lusaka international airport and the person responsible for clearing ANC members and visitors to Zambia.

It was the Zambian police, not the ANC’s own security department, that started the sequence of events that led to this discovery. Oshkosh had used his privileged position to assist the alleged drug-smuggling activities of a well-known Zambian politician, Sikota Wina, and his name was linked to Bhekimpi ka Gwala, whose real name was unknown and was working as a transport officer for the ANC in Lusaka.

In a pre-emptive move, Oshkosh fled to Botswana, travelling with Piper, who had recently returned from training at the Lenin School in Moscow and had reason to fear that he was about to be sent back to Angola. While in Moscow, because he was a brilliant student and was outstanding politically, the Soviet instructors began to trust him. On MK Chief of Staff Joe Slovo’s initiative, Piper was even invited to a meeting of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s (CPSU) Central Committee in the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany). However, when he came back to Moscow he started behaving strangely and had to be recalled to Africa. Some Soviet instructors suspected his perfect behaviour, and he began to panic that he was about to be exposed.

Oshkosh and Piper travelled to Botswana on tickets supplied by Faru (aka “Simon Pharoah” or “John Mogale”), whose real name was Matlaku Montshioa. Faru was working for the Youth Secretariat in Lusaka, also a former political instructor in Angola. Actually, on 28 February 1981, ANC Treasurer-General, Thomas Nkobi, had requested the Botswana authorities to release to the ANC both Oshkosh and Piper, who had been arrested for leaving Zambia on 14 February 1981 illegally without passports. Piper and Oshkosh were deported from Botswana to Lusaka, and under interrogation, Piper admitted that he was working for the apartheid security police and there were others in the network.

He then revealed Kenneth Mahamba (real name Timothy Kgositsile Seremane), former Camp Commander of Quibaxe, who was blamed for killing Joel “Mahlathini” Gxekwa, whose real name was Thamsanqa Ndunge, a talented star of Amandla Cultural Ensemble. Another person that was mentioned by Piper was Vusi Mayekiso, real name Derrick Leballo, who was responsible for poisoning cadres in Novo Catengue in what came to be known as Black September in 1977. All three were recruited by the Special Branch in Mafikeng, which was working within the Bophuthatswana bantustan. Faru also confessed that he was recruited at John Vorster Square in Johannesburg, and his training lasted only two weeks. No evidence was provided of the recruitment, training, instructions or espionage activities of Oshkosh and Bhekimpi, two other agents that were active in Lusaka.

In a speech made by Thomas Nkobi on 4 April 1981, “The enemy plan was to strike a mortal blow on 12th March [1981]. It had created a wide network of assassins recruited from among ourselves of course to be reinforced on that night by its own storm troopers to supervise. It then would have been able to say to the world that the killings were a result of internal squabble[s] and division within the movement … The enemy was poised to strike.”

Mahamba, Mayekiso, Piper, Oshkosh and Faru were executed in Angola by firing squad between 1981 and 1984. Another self-confessed agent, Balili Mpila (MK name of Joseph Mokoena), who was employed in the treasury in Lusaka, was executed in 1982. The fate of Bhekimpi ka Gwala is not clear although he had made confessions of theft from the organisation and involvement in the smuggling of cars. One of the interrogators of these apartheid agents, Ephraim Mfalapitsa, deserted MK and became an Askari, resulting in him being charged for the killing of the COSAS 4 on 15 February 1982.

The discovery of this sophisticated apartheid agents network came to be known as the “Shishita Crisis” within the ranks of the ANC, particularly in Lusaka, which had preceding connections in Angola. The word “Shishita”, according to Hugh Macmillan, “is a Bemba word that took on the meaning of the English word ‘loiter’ and was used in Zambia to describe campaigns against unregistered aliens, people in possession of unlicensed firearms and stolen goods, or those judged in terms of colonial-era legislation to be ‘loitering with intent’”.

Approximately 60 people were arrested by the ANC’s NAT, National Intelligence and Security Department, in Zambia and were then transferred for interrogation and redeployed to Angola. The regional political commissar in Lusaka, Uriah Mokeba, divided those who had been removed from Lusaka into four categories: enemy agents who were planning to assassinate leaders; smugglers who were being used by the enemy; people who were removed for indiscipline and defiance; and others who were going to help with the investigations.

Although the “Shishita Crisis” were largely identified in Lusaka and Botswana, more people were investigated in Angola and people were taken there from all over the Southern African region. Some of the cadres who were arrested at this time were either falsely implicated or had merely shown signs of ill-discipline, particularly amongst the June 16 and Moncada Detachments in Angola. Most of these detachments had been moved from other camps in Angola to Fazenda in November 1978, which was a camp that was called “Villa Rosa”, located in the north of Quibaxe Camp 13.

The reason for moving the cadres to Fazenda was that the leadership intended to have them prepared for harsh conditions of rural guerrilla warfare, and the camp was identified as suitable for a tough three-month survival course. After completing the course, cadres were informed that they were to be deployed inside the country to carry out combat missions. They undertook the course with high morale and enthusiasm, looking forward to being involved in action inside the country. When the three months passed and another refresher course was introduced, disgruntlement began to emerge among the cadres, as they regarded the whole process to be a farce that was meant to keep them busy rather than sending them for deployment inside South Africa.

The high level of demoralisation and discontentment that emerged at the time was directed towards the leadership of Umkhonto we Sizwe, which was accused of inefficiency and even collaboration with the enemy, such that those who had been infiltrated back into the country suffered massive arrests and ‘mysterious’ deaths. Despite the enthusiasm and uncontrollable desire to leave Angola to be infiltrated into South Africa to become part of the mass political uprisings, it was accompanied by considerable concerns that the front commanders were treacherously involved in deliberate failure of many missions, which led to cadres being delivered to the apartheid security forces on a silver platter.

These disgruntlements were unfortunately compounded by the discovery of the spy network in Zambia, linking them to certain cadres in Angola, where the ANC had been operating under intense security circumstances, since the Black September event in 1977. Following this event, the leadership had decided to send a number of cadres for training abroad in the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), where they underwent intensive training in security and intelligence. The newly trained security officers were able to put their training to good use, establishing a prison camp, which was called Camp 32, and later Morris Seabelo Rehabilitation Centre or colloquially referred to as “Quatro”.

Those who had been part of the spy network under the “Shishita Crisis” were incarcerated in Quatro alongside those who were displaying signs of dissent as a result of discontentment with the circumstances in Angola. The message was clear to cadres in Fazenda and other camps such as Pango, Quibaxe and Camalundi (aka Hoji ya Henda) that dissent would never be tolerated. Nonetheless, many of the Fazenda cadres were moved to the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe Front to fight alongside the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) forces until they had to be withdrawn from the Assembly Points that were established as a result of the Lancaster Agreements. Fazenda was shut down in 1980 and most of the cadres were moved either to Pango or to Quibaxe Camp 13.

The Shishita Report, which was developed by the ANC’s Department of Security and Intelligence, became a detailed document on the spy network in Zambia and Angola, as well as other Front-Line States. It maintained that “Central to our study and analyses of these activities must be our understanding of the objectives the regime has set itself in its struggle against the African National Congress. Indeed, the dialectics of struggle demand that the regime set itself the task not of slowing down the struggles in South Africa and internationally, not of undermining and destabilising the Organisation but of wiping it out as a factor in the body-politic of South Africa.”

The report went on to say, “All its internal policies and practices, its economic pressures and acts of armed aggression against neighbouring independent African States and its activities against the African National Congress – the infiltration of police agents, the destabilisation campaigns, assassination plots, etc are designed to perpetuate the status quo in South Africa. A pre-condition for the perpetuation of white racist domination in South Africa is the total destruction of the African National Congress. Over the last decade or so the racist regime has steadily infiltrated into our organisation a number of trained police agents. Whilst the activities of some police agents or groups of police agents may appear to be confined or limited to specific sectors, these activities are all interlocking and co-ordinated into one general offensive.”

The analysis of the report was that their long-term objective was to infiltrate spies who would stir up dissent and agitate for a Morogoro-style Conference that would facilitate the election of spies to replace the cohort of “tried and tested” leadership of the organisation. Emerging leadership core of spies, the majority of whom “appear to have been drawn from an emerging middle class within African society, and a closely related social stratum, lumpen proletariat”, would then attempt to destroy the ANC from within, accept the strict preconditions to enter into negotiations with the racist regime and ensure that the ANC is reintegrated into the status quo of Bantustans, and by doing so bring an end to the national liberation struggle of South Africa, if not all time, at least for the foreseeable future.

The report then strongly recommended that: “the entire organisation, its various structures, links and operations be subjected to enquiry and examination in order to reveal and eliminate all areas of weakness from the security point of view; we revert and strictly adhere to the principle of recruitment and that this task – together with the proper guidelines and checks – be assigned to the internal structures of our organisation; recruitment be based primarily on the working class and its strongest ally, the peasantry; our own security services be completely overhauled with a view to promoting greater professionalism and efficiency; the legitimate grievances of the membership whether real or imagined, be dealt with as they arise.”

Apologies were tendered for wrongful arrest, many of them were later released and they were reintegrated into the exile community, and in some cases provided with opportunities to pursue academic studies. The ANC took collective responsibility for all bona fide MK actions and regretted the violations which did take place in Camp 32 (also known as the Morris Seabelo Rehabilitation Centre, or Quatro) and other camps that had been a source of serious concern within the ANC, when information reached the leadership and other structures. The Movement apologised to those who had been affected, their families and next-of-kin for the suffering and hurt that such actions caused.

In its second submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the ANC acknowledged “that more could have been done in all the periods under review. And, to the extent that we violated the human rights of prisoners and suspects, the ANC again expresses regret and apologises to those who were subjected to ill-treatment, to their families, and to the nation. Above all the ANC apologises to all who were wrongfully accused of working with the apartheid regime and other hostile agencies.”

Sources:
South African History Archives (SAHA).
African National Congress, “Further Submissions and Responses by the African National Congress to Questions Raised by the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation”, 12 May 1997.
Luli Callinicos, “Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains”, David Philip Publishers, 2004.
James Ngculu, “The Honour to Serve: Recollections of an Umkhonto Soldier”, David Philip Publishers, 2009.
Paul Trewhela, “Inside Quatro: Uncovering the Exile History of the ANC and SWAPO”, Jacana, 2009.
Paul Holden and Hennie Van Vuuren, “The Devil in the Detail: How the Arms Deal Changed Everything”, Jonathan Ball, 2011.
Luli Callinicos, “Oliver Tambo and the Dilemma of the Camp Mutinies in Angola in the Eighties”, South African Historical Journal, Vol. 64 No. 3, 2012.
Stephen Ellis, “External Mission: The ANC in Exile”, Jonathan Ball, 2012.
Hugh Macmillan, “Shishita: A Crisis in the ANC In Exile in Zambia, 1980–1981”, In Kessel, Ineke, et al., “One Hundred Years of the ANC: Debating Liberation Histories Today”, Wits University Press, 2012.
Thula Simpson, “Umkhonto we Sizwe: The ANC’s Armed Struggle”, Penguin, 2016.
Vusi Mavimbela, “Time is Not the Measure: A Memoir”, Real African Publishers, 2018.

Castro Khwela
Good day fellow Compatriots!