The Battle of Isandlwana

On 22 January 1879, the Battle of Isandlwana was the first major encounter in the Anglo-Zulu War between the British Empire and the Zulu Kingdom. Eleven days after the British commenced their invasion of Zululand in Southern Africa, a Zulu force of some 20,000 warriors annihilated a portion of the British main column consisting of about 1,800 British, colonial and native troops and perhaps 400 civilians.

Following the scheme by which Lord Carnarvon had brought about the “Confederation of Canada” through the 1867 British North America Act, it was thought that a similar plan might succeed in South Africa. Accordingly, in 1877 Sir Henry Bartle Frere was appointed as High Commissioner for Southern Africa to instigate the scheme. One of the obstacles to such a plan was primarily the Kingdom of the Zulu, which the British Empire would attempt to overcome by force of arms.

Bartle Frere, on his own initiative, without the approval of the British government and with the intent of instigating a war with the Zulu, had presented a provocative ultimatum to the Zulu King Cetshwayo on 11 December 1878 with which the Zulu King could not possibly comply. When the ultimatum expired a month later, Frere ordered Lord Chelmsford to proceed with an invasion of Zululand, for which plans had already been made.

Chelmsford, the Commander-in-Chief of British forces during the war, initially planned a five-pronged invasion of Zululand consisting of over 16,500 troops in five columns and designed to encircle the Zulu army and force it to fight as he was concerned that the Zulus would avoid battle, slip around the British and over the Tugela, and strike at Natal.

Cetshwayo sent the 24,000 strong main Zulu impi from near present-day Ulundi, on 17 January, across the White Umfolozi River with the following command to his warriors: “March slowly, attack at dawn and eat up the red ears (IsiZulu – ondlebezikhanyilanga)!”

On 21 January they moved into the Ngwebeni Valley, where they remained concealed, planning to attack the British on 23 January, but they were discovered by a scouting party on 22 January. Under the command of General Ntshigwayo kaMahole, the Zulu army had reached its position in easy stages. The speed of the Zulu advance compared to the British was marked. The Zulu impi had advanced over 80 km in five days, while Chelmsford had only advanced slightly over 16 km in 10 days.

The British under Chelmsford pitched camp at Isandlwana on 20 January, but did not follow standing orders to entrench. No circling of the wagons was formed, as Chelmsford did not see the need for one. Therefore the chief reason for the failure to take defensive precautions appears to have been that the British command severely underestimated the Zulus’ capabilities.

The Zulu forces were equipped mainly with the traditional assegai iron spears and cow-hide shields, but also had a number of muskets and antiquated rifles. The British and colonial troops were armed with the modern Martini-Henry breechloading rifles and two 7-pounder mountain guns deployed as field guns, as well as a Hale rocket battery.

Despite a vast disadvantage in weapons technology, the Zulus ultimately overwhelmed the British force, killing over 1,300 troops, including all those out on the forward firing line. The Zulu army suffered around 1,000 men killed. The battle was a decisive victory for the valiant Zulus and caused the defeat of the first British invasion of Zululand. The Imperialist British Army had suffered its worst defeat against an indigenous foe equipped with vastly inferior military technology.

Accordingly, the 1979 Umkhonto we Sizwe’s (MK’s) Isandlwana Detachment was named after 100 years of the Battle of Isandlwana – when the Zulu regiments defeated the British forces in 1879.

“March slowly, attack at dawn and eat up the red ears (ondlebezikhanyilanga)!” those were King Cetshwayo KaMpande’s orders.

Castro Khwela
Good day fellow Compatriots!