The Incipient MK High Command under Threat

The Incipient MK High Command under Threat

On 4 July 1963, the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) National High Command gathered at their Rivonia Headquarters to hear Arthur Goldreich submitting a Logistics Committee report on the production requirements of the guerrilla warfare plan. Goldreich had been part of a Zionist urban guerrilla group in Israel in the late 1940s, whereas others had fought in the Second World War. During the discussions that were taking place, Govan Mbeki made notes on the following: It was “Incorrect to say the liberation movement given itself to military methods”.

This was written when an argument that the entire liberation movement should be thrown behind the shift to guerrilla warfare received the rebuttal that there was still a lot of political work to be done and hence it was wrong to advocate that the liberation movement was to be given over wholly to military methods. When the advocates of guerrilla warfare were asked, “How? Where? We have no friendly borders”, they responded that the movement could obtain a place in the protectorates to which guerrillas could retreat. This drew the objection that such a notion was totally unrealistic, upon which Mbeki jotted down “cross border of protectorates”.

One of the critics of the plan argued against the proponents that it would be incorrect to undertake such an action without taking into consideration the other components of the Congress Alliance. Mbeki then noted that “Liberation movement not ignored”. When one of the champions of the plan uttered that the government was arming itself, and the only way of meeting this was also to take up arms and adopt guerrilla warfare, an opponent responded that the government was not arming out of strength. However, it was because the apartheid government was feeling the pressure of the mass political organisations, thus making it necessary to step up that method of pressure.

Mbeki again made a note, “Government not resorting to arms out of strength. It is not a happy choice. Compelled by nature of the struggle”. Indeed, the apartheid government was being compelled by developments to neutralise the mushrooming MK threat, as towards the end of June, Lieutenant Willem “Willie” van Wyk, a Security Branch Detective told his superior, Colonel George Klindt, that he had received information from an African source claiming that Walter Sisulu was living in Rivonia with a man known to the source only as “The Caretaker”. Van Wyk was then instructed by Klindt to locate the hideout no matter how much the costs were.

Unfortunately, Van Wyk and his informer were struggling to locate Sisulu’s Rivonia hideout. On the afternoon of 2 July 1963, Lieutenant van Wyk was sitting in his office on the sixth floor of The Grays, the security police headquarters in Johannesburg, when he received a call from a colleague who said that he had with him someone claiming to know the whereabouts of Walter Sisulu, a member of the MK high command. It was never established who the polices informant was, but he was said to have been someone that MK had earlier taken through Bechuanaland for military training abroad. After he had eventually led police to Liliesleaf Farm, the informant was paid a reward of R6 000, which was at that time a massive sum.

Essentially, the biggest threat to the High Command was that two Alliance members were already in apartheid police custody since 24 June and the Liliesleaf Farm had to be classified as a security risk by all the Comrades. The two members were Bartholomew Hlapane, an SACP Central Committee member, who had previously attended meetings at Liliesleaf Farm; and Abel Mthembu, a member of the MK Johannesburg Regional Command, who had travelled to and from the farm with his Commander, Elias Motsoaledi.

According to these latest developments, on the same day, Denis Goldberg had decided to live in a cottage in Johannesburg’s Mountain View suburb. Similarly, Raymond Mhlaba and Govan Mbeki took up residence at Travallyn Farm, in the district of Krugersdorp. The prevalent atmosphere was that the movements of the High Command were being monitored. During this period, the gestapo South African Police’s budget was increased significantly, with much of the increase being absorbed by the Branch. Again, in the same period, General Hendrik van den Bergh, known as “Lang (Tall) Hendrik”, was appointed commanding officer of the Branch, and it hardened and expanded during his tenure.

The Security Branch’s surveillance capabilities had been improved in the early 1960s, and it interrogated a large number of political detainees during the first half of the decade. Van den Bergh had set up a special unit, with the blessing of Minister of Justice John Vorster, known as the “Sabotage Squad”, which was established to monitor and interrogate virtually all suspected anti-apartheid activists. Together with Vorster, Van den Bergh had joined the “Ossewabrandwag” (the “Ox-wagon Sentinel”), a paramilitary organisation modelled on the Nazi Sturmabteilung (“Storm Division” or “Storm Troopers”), which engaged in acts of sabotage against the British-colonial South African government to undermine the war effort.

The Sabotage Squad was a forerunner to later Branch units: it was during this period that the Security Branch secured its enduring reputation for brutality and torture. It was later established that several Security Branch officers received training in interrogation techniques and surveillance capabilities in foreign countries, including in France. In 1963, Van den Bergh founded South Africa’s first intelligence agency, Republican Intelligence, a direct offshoot of the Security Branch, and the precursor to the Bureau of State Security (BOSS).

For example, on 5 July 1963, a telegram sent from the Office of the Bechuanaland Police Commissioner to the Territory’s Government Secretary indicated that during Joe Slovo’s visit to the country, he made a turn to Jack Hodgson in Lobatse and, according to their sources, he discussed arrangements for wholesale airlifts via Bechuanaland of South African “refugees” that were destined for sabotage training in Tanganyika. It is certain that the Security Branch had solid intelligence to conduct surveillance on Slovo, and most probably it had an informant inside the ANC.

Furthermore, the correspondence noted that Slovo attempted unsuccessfully to contact Mpho Motsamai of the opposition Bechuanaland People’s Party (BPP), who was out of the country at the time. Nonetheless, Slovo managed to meet most of the BPP leaders and officials in the territory. The BPP’s formation was indirectly stimulated by the flow of South African exiles following the Sharpeville Massacre in March 1960 and its structure was based on that of the ANC.

Sources:
Wikipedia.
South African History Online (SAHO).
Martin Legassick, “Armed Struggle and Democracy: The Case of South Africa”, Discussion Paper 20, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 2002.
Vladimir Shubin with Marina Traikova, “‘There is no threat from the Eastern Bloc”, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 3, International Solidarity, Part II, 2015.
Stephen Ellis, “The Genesis of the ANC’S Armed Struggle In South Africa, 1948-1961”, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4, December 2011.
Dale T. McKinley, “Umkhonto We Sizwe: A Critical Analysis of the Armed Struggle of the African National Congress”, South African Historical Journal, Vol. 70, Issue 2, 2018.
Simon Stevens, “Violence, Political Strategy and the Turn to Guerrilla Warfare by the Congress Movement in South Africa”, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 47, No. 6, 2021.
Thula Simpson, “Umkhonto we Sizwe: The ANC’s Armed Struggle”, Penguin, 2016.
Stephen Ellis, “External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960–1990”, Jonathan Ball, 2013.

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