Frontline States under Pressure

Frontline States under Pressure

On 23 February 1985, Botswana Foreign Minister, G.K.T. Chiepe, was present when African National Congress (ANC) President Oliver Tambo and Thabo Mbeki met Botswana President Masire, the Botswana Commissioner of Police, S. Hirschfeldt, the Head of the Security Branch, A. Hirschfeldt, and Army Chief, Major General Merafe, in Gaborone, Botswana. Masire indicated that Botswana had decided that all ANC military cadres in the country were to be removed, and only bona fide refugees were to be allowed to stay.

When the time came for Tambo to respond, he requested that the previous ANC Chief Representative, Isaac Makopo, and the ANC military representative be allowed back into Botswana to continue their tasks. Masire rejected both requests and then Tambo promised to withdraw all MK cadres.

The meeting followed another event the previous day, on 22 February 1985, whereby apartheid Foreign Minister Pik Botha and Botswana’s Foreign Minister, G.K.T. Chiepe, met in Pretoria as the heads of delegation of their two countries. Following the security pacts with Mozambique (1984) and Swaziland (1982), South Africa was seeking a similar success in Botswana through a bilateral agreement with the government.

Botha indicated that the meeting’s main purpose was to find agreement on the serious issue of the infiltration into South Africa of ANC and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) “terrorists”. It appeared, Botha argued, that the two countries were not making satisfactory progress on the matter. Chiepe disagreed that no progress was made, although it was slow, nonetheless certain problems had been solved. For example, according to Chiepe, Botswana was not allowing trained “terrorists” to enter its territory and was also prepared to provide information on people caught with weapons of war. Furthermore, though there were indications of increased ANC activity in Botswana, the country was doing more about it than before.

She pointed out that the country was under the impression that it was expected to sign an agreement with South Africa, which according to her, was unnecessary, since both countries were good neighbours and not at war. Pik Botha responded that he could see that Botswana would be in a difficult political position if it was to sign a pact with South Africa. In fact, Botha indicated that he had abandoned the idea of a Nkomati-type agreement with the country, because results on the ground were more important.

Indeed, at the end of 1984, the main feature of the situation in southern Africa, according to the ANC’s analysis, was the failure of Pretoria and its Western backers to impose Nkomati-type agreements on other countries in the region. This was also clear to those sectors of the international community that were somewhat reluctant to be involved in direct relations with the ANC, like the United States, that the prospect of a political settlement was a realistic one, and that therefore there was a need for diplomatic initiatives.

The apartheid authorities had set themselves the goal of eliminating the ANC presence in the neighbouring states by applying a carrot-and-stick policy to secure their neighbours’ co-operation: on the one hand, promises of economic aid and cessation of Pretoria’s support for the anti-government forces, and, on the other, destabilisation, both military and economic. However, increasing international attention on the problems of South Africa was evident in late 1984 and the Frontline states were also determined to reject Nkomati-type agreements.

This was evident in September 1984 at the Arusha conference held at the initiative of the Socialist International. Its participants included may prominent West European leaders. In addition, during 1984, approaches were made to the ANC by both the United States administration and the Botha regime, indicating the lines on which “talks” may be arranged to settle the conflict in Southern Africa.

The ANC had recognised that the plan being mooted between United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr Chester Crocker, and apartheid President PW Botha, was calling for the national liberation movement’s total surrender. It had the objective of compelling the ANC to abandon the armed struggle, to terminate its alliance with the SACP, and for the Movement to sever ties with the socialist countries.

With regard to the Frontline States, the pressure was being brought to bear on Botswana, which was also placing Zimbabwe into the line of fire, as part of apartheid South Africa’s “following to the letter the tactics employed by the United States in Central America and Israel in the Middle East – using its military and economic muscle and all manner of dirty tricks to install governments of its choice in the neighbouring states” (Brian Bunting: Sechaba, April 1985). For instance, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe said that PW Botha started to speak very arrogantly “soon after his meeting with Dr Chester Crocker, United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs … We cannot avoid the feeling that we have all along been cheated. But may I state, emphatically, that although cheated, yes, we have been, blackmailed we shall not be!” (Shubin).

Oliver Tambo also stressed that the ANC “had got over the shock of Nkomati. We have adjusted”. Furthermore, according to Tambo, “At great cost to themselves and their people, the Front Line States have borne the brunt of overt racist aggression, deliberate acts of economic disruption and political destabilisation. To their great credit, they have stood united and resolute in their commitment to the cause of Arican freedom and independence, and especially in their total support for the ANC and SWAPO (South West Africa People’s Organisation)” (Sechaba, March 1985).

This was also reflected in the ANC’s analysis, which stated that “the racist-imperialist offensive against the independent states and liberation movements of Southern Africa must be combated on all fronts: The armed struggle must be intensified and ever more weighty blows struck against the enemy. The struggles of the oppressed peoples in South Africa … must be raised to a new level and co-ordinated. The underground presence of the ANC and SACP inside the country must become an effective reality so that the mobilisation of the masses can become a continuous process, and proper political leadership provided to the people. More determined efforts must be made to win to our side increasing numbers of White democrats. International solidarity action must be stepped up to isolate the South African regime militarily, politically and economically” (Brian Bunting: Sechaba, April 1985).

Sources:
South African History Online (SAHO).
Stephen Ellis, “External Mission: The ANC in Exile”.
Thula Simpson, “Umkhonto we Sizwe: The ANC’s Armed Struggle”.
Vladimir Shubin, “ANC: View from Moscow”.
Brian Bunting, “Warmongers Who Talk of Peace: United States Strategy in Southern Africa”, Sechaba, April 1985).
President OR Tambo, “Render South Africa Ungovernable: Message Delivered in Lusaka, January 8, 1985”, Sechaba, March 1985).

Castro Khwela
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