Wankie Campaign – The Main Group Confrontation with the Rhodesian Forces

Wankie Campaign – The Main Group Confrontation with the Rhodesian Forces

On 23 August 1967, approximately 19 kilometres south-east of the previous day’s battle area, the Main Group of the Tsholotsho and Luthuli Detachments, slept in foxholes concealed by trees and branches, as helicopters and jets were circling above. These were the epic battles of the Wankie Campaign, as the Main Group, consisting of the Tsholotsho and Luthuli Detachments, gallantly fought and proved their guerrilla warfare proficiency by overwhelming the well-armed and fully-equipped Rhodesian security forces (It is quite long but worth reading).

It all began on 12 August 1967, two days after the main group entered the Wankie Game Reserve, as they had reached the middle of the park, the Lupane Group, under the leadership of Jonathan Moyo (aka “David Madziwa Matho”) of the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), began to branch off towards the east, as per the plan outlined by Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) Commander, Joe Modise, at Dube’s Farm during the final week of July. The Lupane Group, which was composed of twenty-three combatants, had in their presence Basil February (aka “Paul Peterson”), who on 16 August 1967 got killed in a farm in Figtree before achieving the intention of infiltrating into South Africa.

The same day, 12 August 1967, The Tsholotsho Group and the Luthuli Detachment continued with their march southwards, as the Reconnaissance Team, under the leadership of Zolile Nqose, and consisting of Rashid Kawawa, Eric Nduna, Joseph Nduli and Phiri Malama, who were still in the company of “Mzala”, Don Maseko and Amos Ndlovu, were struggling to reconnect with the main group.

Ultimately, on 16 August 1967, while Zolile Nqose, Rashidi Kawawa and Amos Ndlovu were in the game camp, which they later discovered was in Botswana, they were arrested by the Botswana police without a fight. After the arrest, Amos Ndlovu was taken by the Botswana Police to the place where they left other members of the group on 12 August 1967, where they found some rifles, as well as Don Maseko’s corpse, who was struggling to move when they left the other members of the Reconnaissance Team.

Two days later, on 18 August 1967, the twenty-three guerrillas of the Lupane Group went west through Lupane where they got involved in a fierce battle at the Inyatuwe River, four kilometres south of the Inyatuwe Railway Siding in the Wankie District. They killed several Rhodesian security forces and lost five of their fighters. They were later intercepted by the Rhodesian forces as they were retreating to the west of the Wankie Game Reserve, resulting in a number of them being shot and others apprehended in the ensuing skirmishes.

Their commander, Jonathan Moyo, who was the only survivor, was on 19 August 1967 arrested in the village not far from the battlefield. There was speculation that a ZIPRA fighter, Patrick Mantayana, who was found by a Platoon led by Warrant Officer Wurayayi, of the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR), on 6 August 1967, had revealed the detachment’s presence in the Wankie Game Reserve.

On the morning of 20 August 1967, the Tsholotsho Group and the Luthuli Detachment were taking turns to fetch water from a dam, which was slightly outside the Wankie Game Reserve. At around 08:00, the Commander of the Main Group, John Dube (aka “Sotsha Ngwenya”), instructed Chris Mampuru, Alfred Willie and Ernest Modulo to observe the dam in order to shoot any game that was coming to the water, while the rest of the group went to take cover in a bush nearby. As they were still under cover of the bush, a truck appeared about 100 metres away, which was following the guerrilla tracks along the pathway that the cadres had used. Since the tracks were still fresh, there was a great possibility that some of the communities living nearby had noticed them. When the truck reached the point where the tracks began to split, it stopped, approximately 80 metres away from where the guerrillas were hiding.

When the truck stopped, a white officer got out and began conversing with the men at the back. One of the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) cadres, Norman Duka, noticed one African soldier manning a huge machine gun, as well as a heavy artillery piece at the back. After a few minutes, the white officer instructed the driver to follow the direction of the dam, instead of going towards the direction of the main guerrilla force.

At that moment, five more trucks appeared, with about five men each at the back. The trucks were followed an armoured personnel carrier, carrying about a section of mixed black and white Rhodesian soldiers. When the convoy got to the dam, they were followed by aeroplanes that were flying overhead. Just then, the guerrillas heard the sound of rifle fire, and the shouts, “Surrender! Surrender!” After those shouts, there were sounds of gunfire, insinuating a firefight, which lasted about two minutes, followed by complete silence.

The Main Group then began to crawl away from the gunfire, but their mobility was hindered by spotter planes that were flying above. Towards sunset, the guerrillas heard the sounds of trucks moving away from the dam, and the aeroplanes began to disappear. After everything was quiet, the Commander, Dube, sent a team of six cadres to the dam to see what had happened to the three cadres that were supposed to observe the dam. The Team came back and reported that they could not find the three.

The Main Group then moved from its position towards some forest, lying approximately a kilometre away from the bush they were occupying, where they decided to rest for the night. During the course of the night, sounds of trucks could be heard as they were moving up and down the entire area.

On the morning of 21 August 1967, they decided to move on, heading westwards and later on southwards. At approximately 10:00, they crossed a wire fence, which meant that they were entering the Wankie Game Reserve again. The Commander decided that since the place was bushy and thus provided enough cover, they should set up a kraal, consisting of a headquarters housing the commanders in the middle, and the various groups providing perimeter cover facing all directions. During that period, they could hear the dogs barking from nearby villages. The Rhodesians were not only within feet of the group, but they also flailed about, shooting in the wrong direction.

Undoubtedly, the Rhodesian security forces were recognising that these men were accomplished guerrilla fighters, archetypical guerrillas: masters of their environment, deftly moving in and out of view, screening themselves from detection. The numerically superior guerrilla group could have mounted a successful attack on the eighteen Rhodesian soldiers but instead chose to withdraw. The decision to retreat underneath a tall stand of trees was a conscious effort to seek adequate cover from the aerial surveillance. The men quickly dug foxholes to embed themselves in the terrain. The men calmly applied their knowledge of tactics, which in practice was demonstrated to be appropriate to the situation at hand.

In the early hours of the morning, on 22 August 1967, Commander of the Main Group, consisting of the Tsholotsho Group and the Luthuli Detachment, Commander John Dube instructed two members of the Group, “Nkotheni” and “George”, to change into their civilian clothes and search for villagers who would be able to supply them with food. Dube also instructed Tennis Khumalo to fetch some water, who on his way back noticed a white Land Rover, which he suspected belonged to the police, which implied that the enemy was patrolling the area.

Following Tennis Khumalo’s report, Dube instructed the other soldiers to maintain their positions for the afternoon, and this was intended for until they were to depart again in the evening. When Nkotheni and George returned at approximately 10:00, they had food that they received from an African cattle farmer. After seeing what they brought, Dube sent them back to the farmer to ask if he could provide enough food for the entire Group. When they returned around midday, they had a four-gallon tin containing sour milk (“maas”) with porridge. The guerrillas then went up in groups to have the “maas” dished into their water bottles, to drink and to eat with porridge.

After having their midday meal, the guerrillas were divided into sections and then deployed into their foxholes. At the middle was the headquarters, where a group of five, including John Dube, Chris Hani, Lennox Tshali and Leonard Nkosi, was based. Other guerrillas were deployed in a semi-circular position facing the north-east direction, from where they moved. Three Light Machine Guns (LMGs) were deployed in each flank, in the middle and in between were other small guns.

Meanwhile, in between 14:00 and 14:30, while food was being served to the last section, the group commander of the Sibasa section, Julius Maliba (aka “Manchecker”), reported to the headquarters. According to Maliba, there were complaints within his section about the food, while other members of the Sibasa section were trying to get some sleep. Nobody from their group was keeping guard, while it was one of the critical units directly facing north-east, from where the enemy was anticipated to come through following the tracks.

During the quarrelling, gunfire was targeted on the section of the line where the Sibasa and the Cape Town groups were located. This was followed by shouts of “Surrender!” and “Habanza chalita!” (You’re finished!), as a fragmentation grenade was tossed into the Sibasa section. The grenade explosion resulted in the immediate death of Robert Baloyi and Barry Masipa, with Sparks Moloi being seriously wounded by a bullet fired into his chest. Simultaneously, Peter Mhlongo was shot through his upper arm and thigh, while Charles Sishuba of the Cape Town group was hit just above his eye, and died instantly. Despite the casualties, the Sibasa group began firing back and managed to hold the enemy at bay.

As three aeroplanes began circling overhead, Thula Bopela noticed a black Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) soldier standing eighty metres to the right of the guerrillas, leaning against a tree with an ammunition belt over his shoulder, spraying bullets above the heads of his men with a Bren gun. This man, Sergeant Major C.S.M. Timitiya, had the guerrillas pinned down with volley fire from his machine gun, while shouting “Surrender! Surrender Terrorist!” At the same time, he was directing and commanding his troops.

The guerrillas kept their heads down, holding their fire, and maintaining their silence, as instructed by their commanders. Without any reaction from the guerrillas, the RAR units began dropping their backpacks, kneeling in a long line in front of the guerrillas and resumed firing. However, due to the thick bushes, they could not clearly see where the guerrillas were hidden. Thereafter, they were heard saying, “Where are they? Where are the terrorists?”

While members of the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) were on their feet trying to locate the guerrilla positions, the Light Machine Gun (LMG) at the centre of the Main Group’s half-circle began to fire. Meanwhile Mongameli Tshali (aka “Lennox Lagu”) crawled to his unit, the Luthuli Detachment, which was on the left of the half-circle, and Chris Hani also crawled to the Tsholotsho Group, which was on the right, giving instructions to fire at the enemy. Following the LMG’s fire, the rest of the Main Group started firing at the RAR sections. As the gunfire persisted, a grenade was exploded into the Main Group, resulting in the LMG becoming silent.

After firing with him submachine rifle, Leonard Nkosi, who was part of the commanding unit, began crawling to the right-hand side, towards the Tsholotsho Group. During this heavy firing, Sergeant Major Timitiya dropped his Bren gun and fell face down on the ground. Lieutenant Smith, who was one of the most prominent fighters of the RAR contingent, also fell to the ground, at the same time clutching his chest, as bullets struck his face and he spun round on his back.

Despite having lost their commanders in the skirmish, the RAR troops continued shooting wildly, but after a while, they began running away, and in the confusion of battle and poor visibility, some were running in the direction of the guerrillas, and became victims of guerrilla fire. While the RAR troops were retreating, the guerrillas were advancing on them with both flanks of the half-circle in an encircling manoeuvre. Some of the guerrillas were shouting, “They are running away!” as the rate of fire was diminishing, later on dropping to isolated shots.

Aeroplanes were still flying over the battlefield and Justice Mpanza (aka “Gizenga”), the Commander of the Natal group, ordered that they should be fired upon. As one of the planes flew near to the guerrillas, Commander of the Main Group, John Dube, began firing on it with his LMG. As the plane flew away, guerrillas of the Tsholotsho Group and the Luthuli Detachment began to stand and move forward, as the shooting had completely ceased.

One of the guerrillas, Sparks Moloi, was injured during the skirmish with the RAR forces. He was crawling towards Lewis Nkosi and motioned to him that he had been shot in the stomach. While Nkosi was attending to Moloi, he saw Chris Hani, Justice Mpanza, Theophilus Mkhaliphi and Castro Dolo coming towards them, carrying haversacks similar to those that were carried by the RAR troops. When asking about the backpacks, Hani informed him that they had been taken from the security forces that had withdrawn. Moreover, one European and one African of the security forces had been killed. The team then began to move in a southerly direction, carrying the backpacks, while Jebese Makiwane was helping Leonard Nkosi to carry Sparks Moloi.

As they gathered together in a bush nearby, Hani informed the group that Barry Masipa, Charles Sishuba and Robert Baloyi had been killed, while Julius Maliba (aka “Goodman Moloi” or “Manchecker”), the Commander of the Sibasa Group, had been wounded in the thigh. Others, who were injured in the battle, included Greatwell Mabhija, who had an injury to the head, Peter Mfene, who had a slight injury on his arm, and Sparks Moloi, who was shot in the stomach.

Peter Mfene, at that time, was in possession of a Morse code radio and one walkie-talkie that had been captured from the enemy. As the only radio operator in the Unit who could use the Morse code, he was given the radio to keep, while the walkie-talkie was given to another of the Unit’s radio specialists. Mfene interjected that the Morse code radio could be carried by anyone, and he should be given the walkie-talkie so that he could listen to the enemy communication. Half-an-hour later, a signal came from the walkie-talkie to the effect that the Rhodesian forces were planning an ambush by the dam.

The haversacks obtained from the Rhodesian security forces that had retreated during the battle contained delicacies for the guerrillas, as they descended on the supplies, cheese, biltong, meat, condensed milk and an assortment of other rations that became a feast for soldiers who had, for days, teetered on the brink of starvation. Also among the booty was a brand-new Light Machine Gun (LMG), new uniforms and boots, and in one Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) soldier’s bag, they found an unfinished letter to a girlfriend.

The liberation force’s success in this early battle resounded across the continent. When he spoke later about the fighting, Chris Hani believed that was the moment at which the Luthuli Detachment was transformed into a fighting force. The men’s reaction to the enemy attack reflected courage and faith, and the initial triumph also gave hope to those fighting for liberation all across Africa, echoing throughout South Africa and inspiring a new generation of fighters.

The guerrillas proceeded in an easterly direction, while Julius Maliba (aka “Manchecker”) had to be carried along, as he could not walk, while Sparks Molio, who had died due to his stomach injuries, had to be buried in the bush. At around 23:00, at night, the Main Group had reached a cattle post outside the Wankie Game Reserve, wherein one of the locals informed them that the enemy was around and could come any time. According to the local resident, the enemy was going to kill the residents for not reporting that the guerrillas were around, and as such, they had to pass through the cattle post quickly before they were discovered to have been around. Therefore, the Main Group had to pass through the cattle post without obtaining the food they were hoping for.

A short distance from the village, was the Manzamnyama (or Nata) River, where the Rhodesian ambush team had established itself there. Despite this fact, the Main Group sent a team out periodically to search for water along the river bed. During the course of the night, while the guerrillas were resting, two enemy stragglers approached their position, and the guerrillas opened fire on them. After hearing the sound of gunfire, a group of Rhodesian soldiers proceeded to the dam, to support the ambush team that was positioned there.

The Rhodesian Unit had erroneously interpreted the gunfire as a sign that the ambush team was in battle with the guerrillas. Unfortunately, when they arrived at dam, a firefight broke out between them and the ambush team, as both mistook each other to be guerrillas. Later that evening, with all the guerrillas having returned from the river, they then switched on a transistor radio, with the news reporting that the Rhodesian Security Forces had attacked the terrorists and killed ten of them.

The report caused laughter among the guerrillas as they knew that during the latest engagement with the Rhodesian forces, none of the men were killed. Around 08:00, the following morning, when Peter Mfene opened the walkie-talkie seized from the Rhodesian security forces in the previous day’s battle, the Main Group heard that the Rhodesians had discovered that they killed their own forces.

Accounts of the previous day’s battle hinged on the ill-discipline of sentries. When the guerrillas set up camp after their night march, they positioned the Sibasa group at one sentry post. The Sibasa group wore black jackets and placed those said jackets overhead in the branches of a bush, presumably to shield themselves from the sun while they rested. These men were warned about placing the jackets in full view but that they refused to take them down. The jackets made their position clearly visible, and when the Rhodesians passed through the area, they caught the group by surprise, killing Barry Masipa, Robert Baloyi, and Charles Sishuba, while mortally wounding Sparks Moloi and Peter Mhlongo. In one swift attack, the Rhodesians eliminated most of the Sibasa group. These five men were the only guerrilla casualties incurred during the ensuing battle.

When analysing the challenges that the Main Group – consisting of the Tsholotsho Group and the Luthuli Detachment – encountered with their engagement with the Rhodesian Security Forces, it was obvious that undisclosed grievances caused the Sibasa-bound men to threaten to shoot their commander, who was Julius Maliba (aka “Manchecker”), a celebrated veteran of many subsequent MK campaigns. Charles Sishuba took over the group when Maliba fled, but feeling dominant with their victory over their commander, the group became absolutely uncontrollable. The Rhodesians did not see this group but heard them arguing loudly. This breach of discipline came with consequences, as the Rhodesians fired first at their position and tossed grenades into their blind.

Peter Mhlongo could have spotted the Rhodesians, but did not have time to warn the rest, while the jackets and the loud argument attracted additional attention. Most of the Main Group probably heard shots after the initial contact. An official history of the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) suggested that Rhodesians were tracking the Main Group when they were fired on, thus contending a properly staged ambush laid by the guerrillas.

Another version of the events maintains that around 17:00, on 22 August 1967, while Peter Mhlongo was scanning the surrounding terrain through binoculars captured earlier from the Rhodesians, he spotted enemy forces advancing on their position. Mhlongo sounded the alarm, and the guerrillas took up defensive positions. Morale was high and they were less nervous as a result of their victory the day before. Hani ordered the cadres to aim for the commander and the radio operator, and to hold their fire until the Rhodesians drew close to their position.

Cletus Mzimela recalled that the ZIPRA cadres were always nervous and slept with their rifles cocked. As a result, shots were frequently fired accidentally, and this sporadic gunfire might have alerted Rhodesian soldiers to the presence of insurgents in the game reserve. On the morning of the battle, Mzimela spotted a military radio antenna through the surrounding bush, and awakened Justice “Gizenga” Mpanza, who was sleeping next to him.

In disbelief, Mpanza thought Mzimela was joking, but then a second antenna appeared, and a third. Then they saw rifles and black berets, but the army trucks drove past without any sign that they knew the cadres were lying there. He was awakened later in the day by gunfire. cursed in anger, assuming that one of the ZIPRA fighters had accidentally fired again. He then heard a soldier giving the order for a hand grenade to be tossed into the bush to flush out the guerrillas. The next sound Mzimela heard was an explosion, close by.

As the Rhodesians closed in, Hani ordered the men to hold their fire, reminding them that “every bullet is precious” and that they should not pull the trigger until they could see their targets clearly. The air was thick with tension, but even though this was the first time the guerrillas had come under fire, their nerves held. They allowed the Rhodesians to fire randomly into the air, until a handful of soldiers stood up and called out: “Where are they? Can you see them?” At that moment, Hani gave the order to open fire. Two of the Rhodesian soldiers fell in the first hail of automatic rifle fire. They happened to be officers, and their loss caused pandemonium. The rest of the group scattered in all directions, leaving their weapons and food supplies behind.

In their rucksacks they were carrying the best provisions. There were biscuits and pure, crystal clear water’. They stripped the dead Rhodesian soldiers of their camouflage uniforms and personal items like watches, and the commanders divided the food and water they had recovered among the hungry and thirsty men. For the first time in weeks, they had a decent meal, including cheese, biltong, tinned food and other rations. It was a feast for the guerrilla fighters, and afterwards, they resumed their march to the south.

In the morning of 23 August 1967, approximately 19 kilometres south-east of the previous day’s battle area, the Main Group of the Tsholotsho and Luthuli Detachments, slept in foxholes concealed by trees and branches, as helicopters and jets were circling above. Late in the afternoon, a jet arrived and bombed a forested area about five kilometres ahead of the guerrilla Main Group in the south-east direction, which took approximately forty-five minutes.

The intention of the Main Group was to march at approximately 24 kilometres a day, but due to delays emanating from carrying injured combatants such a pace could not be achieved. If it had been achieved, the bombardment would have been accurate, and it was becoming clear to the Main Group commanders that the enemy was working on efficient intelligence. At approximately 17:00, a Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) platoon, led by Lieutenant William Rodney Winnal, was establishing a base camp for the night just outside, to the south, of the Wankie Game Reserve.

Meanwhile, at the Main Group guerrilla base, lying in his foxhole under some bushes, Harry Hadebe heard dogs barking nearby, which prompted the Commander of the Main Group, John Dube, to task Goliati Thebe and Peri Ncube to go and investigate. After Thebe and Ncube had left, Hadebe heard shots being fired, which was soon confirmed by Thebe and Ncube when they returned that they had shot at enemy soldiers who had established a temporary base nearby.

Immediately, the Main Group Commander, Dube, instructed the radio operator to close it, and then took Thebe and Ncube to show him the enemy position. When Dube left the guerrilla base, he was carrying an FN submachine assault rifle and wearing a green security-force beret, which were items captured from the RAR during the previous day’s battle. One of the guerrillas in the Main Group camp, Morris Ncube, heard shot being fired just after the three men had left, and soon after then he saw Dube running back. When Dube arrived at the camp, he told the Main Group to advance in a line, as the Rhodesian forces were nearby.

The Main Group began to march forward in a “horn” formation, with the flanks of the line advancing ahead in order to encircle the enemy, while the arch of the guerrillas leading back to the centre. At the same time, in the RAR base, while Lieutenant Winnal heard firing to the right of the camp, he was confronted by his Sergeant Major, who claimed to have spotted two terrorists. Soon afterwards, heavy machine gun fire was heard inside the base, which was followed by hand grenade explosions. One of the grenades exploded about 16 metres from Winnal, resulting in shrapnel injuring him on his shoulder, hip and face.

A moment afterwards, he heard somebody shouting, “Attack! Attack! Attack!” And in the next instance, Patrol Officer Thomas, who was one of the dog handlers in the platoon, was shot dead, while he was attempting to get his dog under control. Meanwhile, Chris Hani, James April, Douglas Wana, Jack Simelane, Thula Bopela and Nicholas Donda were firing short bursts, as they were approaching the Rhodesian positions, resulting in the death of a Rhodesian radio operator, while he was calling for a helicopter to provide air support.

As the RAR platoon began to retreat, Jack Simelane was shot dead by a wounded Rhodesian soldier while he was chasing after a fleeing white officer. Involved in the chase of the fleeing Rhodesian soldiers, was Thula Bopela, who then heard Shooter Makasi shouting that Simelane had been hit. After killing one of the Rhodesian soldiers who was attempting to wriggle out of his sleeping bag, Bopela turned to Nicholas Donda, who was immediately shot in the lungs, as he was trying to attend to the dying Simelane. Donda also suffered a gruesome death, and the Rhodesian soldier who shot Simelane to death, is himself shot dead by one of the guerrillas. Bopela then ran to Justice Mpanza, his Commander, to inform him that Donda had been killed; and they then took Donda to the base.

Following the retreat and obliteration of the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) platoon close to the Main Group base on the evening of 23 August 1967, Commander of the Luthuli Detachment, Mongameli Tshali, arrived at the Main Group base and informed Thula Bopela and Justice Mpanza that the enemy had retreated to a patch of bush approximately 300 metres away. Tshali then suggested that they should not leave the enemy there but instead should “wipe them out”. He then told Mpanza, “Bring your section, Comrade Kulak (Mpanza’s nickname), we need your light machine-gunner”. They then left Nicholas Donda behind and began running with Tshali to the enemy position, and on the way, they found Chris Hani pointing out to some fifteen guerrillas the positions where the enemy was attempting to regroup.

There was approximately seventy metres of space between the guerrillas and the Rhodesian security forces. As the guerrillas began to crawl towards the enemy position, James April (aka “George Driver”), who had a white cloth tied around his head, broke ranks and charged towards the enemy, simultaneously firing his machine gun. When he was about halfway across the frontal edge of the battle area, his gun went silent, as he was struggling to feed a magazine to his machine gun.

During that moment, one of the Rhodesian soldiers was firing at him, and Tshali was shouting at him to crawl back. The other guerrillas then provided him with covering fire to divert the enemy’s attention from him. Ultimately, April managed to crawl back to safety. However, due to darkness beginning to envelop the battlefield, the Rhodesian security forces managed to withdraw from the combat area, and the hostilities were momentarily terminated.

Having been forcefully withdrawn from the combat area, the Rhodesian forces left most of their belongings behind, and the Main Guerrilla Group Commander, John Dube, ordered the guerrillas to collect their haversacks, including one that was blood-stained. The guerrillas then moved to the foxholes where they had left some of their wounded during the skirmishes with the RAR platoon. At their base, Chris Hani informed the Main Group that Jack Simelane and Nicholas Donda were killed during the engagement.

It was then decided that they should leave the scene of battle, discard the two enemy radios that had been captured during the engagements, and find a suitable spot to rest. They then marched until around midnight, where they found a donga to halt and rest. Meanwhile, the Commander, Dube, decided to assemble a team to accompany him to fetch drinking water from the Manzamnyama River. Dube then instructed Tshali to command the group in his absence, and left with a group of eight, which included Chris Hani, Jackson Mandla, Alfred Mfamana, James April, Khanja Mlonzi, Graham Morodi and Edward Moyo.

The synopsis of the day, 23 August 1967, was that after they routed the Rhodesians on 22 August 1967, the Main Group left that night; they opted not to stay in a nearby forest and instead set up camp in a patch of bush surrounded by open fields. The reason they stopped in this location was that carrying a wounded guerrilla slowed their progress, while others suggested that the location was less conspicuous than a nearby forest. In either case, their location was fortuitous because the Rhodesians launched airstrikes on the forest, and in between airstrikes, two platoons of RAR troops set up camp next to the guerrillas in the same bush, with the intention to conduct mop-up operations on any survivors of the airstrikes.

Meanwhile, John Dube (aka “Sotsha Ngwenya”), the Commander of the Main Group, dressed in a captured RAR uniform, walked into their base, spoke with some of the troops in IsiNdebele, fired on these men, and was chased out with the Rhodesians in pursuit. The guerrillas quickly assembled an advance team to attack the Rhodesians. Once again, they defeated the Rhodesians, killed two officers, captured an assortment of supplies, and withdrew.

Sources:
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Nicole (Nicky) Martina Van Driel, “The ANC’s First Armed Military Operation: The Luthuli Detachment and the Wankie Campaign, July-September 1967”, Master of Arts: University of the Western Cape, June 2003.
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Castro Khwela
Good evening fellow Compatriots!